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     Conscientious objection has a long tradition of legal and social recognition in 
America.   It evolved as a subset of the constitutional free exercise of religion, and 
encompassed medical practice as well as the military after Roe v. Wade in 1973.  Its 
constitutional protection abruptly changed with a Supreme Court case in 1990.  
Thereafter, medical conscientious objection – the exemption from performing certain acts 
by medical professionals – was regulated largely by legislation.  Many of the conflicts 
arose and were resolved at the state level.  Yet there is little study at the state level of why 
conscientious objection is protected or not.  After an overview of the legal background to 
the issue, this thesis examines some factors that influence the enactment of state 
Religious Freedom Restoration Acts (RFRAs) and “Must Fill” pharmacy requirements.  
Using the religion analytical tools of “belonging, believing, and behaving” applied to all 
50 states, the thesis concludes that there are strong positive relationships between the 
religiosity of a state’s population and its enactment of a RFRA, and strong negative 
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CHAPTER ONE:  INTRODUCTION 
Introduction to the General Topic 
I couldn’t believe that I could not get my pills at a local drug store.  There are high 
numbers of unwed teenage mothers and children growing up in poverty in Meade County.  
Physicians and pharmacists who can keep their jobs even when they have objections to 
birth control limit women’s ability for family planning… causing everything from 
economic distress to relationship rifts… [it’s like] limiting a women’s (sic) access to 
healthy food options 
 
Annie Hamilton, a reporter for the Meade County Messenger, writing an op-ed piece in 
2014.1  
 
So let us work together to reduce the number of women seeking abortions, let’s reduce 
unintended pregnancies.  Let’s make adoption more available.  Let’s provide care and 
support for women who do carry their children to term.   Let’s honor the conscience of 
those who disagree with abortion, and draft a sensible conscience clause, and make sure 
that all of our health care policies are grounded not only in sound science, but also in 
clear ethics, as well as respect for the equality of women.  Those are things we can do.  
President Obama at Notre Dame University, May 17, 2009.2  
     In the last generation many physicians, nurses, and pharmacists have been asked to 
perform some professional services which they have found to be morally repugnant.  The 
choice may be between keeping one’s job or medical license and keeping one’s 
conscience clear.  Conscientious objection by medical professionals can thus be 
characterized as a type of refusal to perform otherwise lawful practices when doing so 
                                                          
1 Annie Hamilton, "Birth Control," Meade County Messenger, no. July 31, 2014 (2014). 
http://www.meadecountymessenger.com/28963/2035/1/home-page  Accessed March 7, 2016. The Meade 
County Messenger is a weekly newspaper serving a small, rural county in Kentucky.  
2 Barack Obama, "Notre Dame Commencement Address," (2009).  https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-




would violate their individual consciences.3  Such a refusal is often protected in federal 
and state law. Under what circumstances is there any legal protection for health care 
workers when they refuse to perform the desired or directed practice?  How has the idea 
of conscientious exemption been recognized and protected over time?  How did it 
evolve?  What is its current status in the United States?   What factors give rise to its 
recognition in contemporary law and society?  If these factors change, is its recognition 
or protection also likely to change?  My thesis will address these points.  
     Even before there was a United States, America recognized and protected 
conscientious objection.  Several colonies, and then the young United States, exempted 
some of its men from military service if they met certain criteria, such as opposition to 
bearing arms under any and all circumstances.4  Such objection was usually predicated on 
some religious belief, such as pacifism, and was usually associated with one of the 
historic “peace churches”, such as the Society of Friends or Mennonites.5  Somewhat 
later, as medical practice became more advanced and effective, some Americans objected 
(for themselves or those they represented, such as their children) to participation in new 
techniques such as vaccinations or blood transfusions.  These practices typically violated 
some religious belief, such as a reliance on faith healing only, or the sanctity or 
inviolability of one’s body.  Limited or expanded protection was sometimes given to 
Americans subject to a potentially great degree of coercion, such as members of the 
military, or prisoners or wards of the state or other institutionalized persons who might 
                                                          
3 M. R. Wicclair, Encyclopedia of Global Bioethics, Chapter on "Conscientious Objection" (Springer, 
2016).  For this reason, Planned Parenthood refers to “conscience laws” as “refusal laws”.  However, I will 
refer to them as “conscience laws” because of the long history of conscientious objection and generally 
accepted usage of the term. 
4 Louis Fisher, Religious Liberty in America: Political Safeguards (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of 
Kansas, 2002). 
5 Peter Brock, Liberty and Conscience, (Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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object to a mandatory inoculation against diseases such as tuberculosis or even 
influenza.6    
     Throughout this modern evolution of the concept, from military conscientious 
objection, to objection to particular medical procedures or medicines, to the conscientious 
objection of medical professionals, a common thread has been that conscientious 
objection has been analyzed in terms of a religious and, more recently, a moral objection, 
to participation in certain religiously abhorrent acts.  Accordingly, courts, elected 
officials, and commentators have generally characterized the issue in terms of a 
constitutional “freedom of exercise” analysis.  Thus, the issue of medical conscientious 
objection is ineluctably bound up with constitutional interpretation and application.7  
     Until the mid-twentieth century, and except for military conscientious objectors, these 
cases were all rather rare because the adherents were often rather odd, a small minority, 
or otherwise marginalized from mainstream society and its norms, or because of special 
circumstances (e.g., because the objectors were institutionalized or hopeful immigrants 
just off the boat.)   Beginning with the Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade, 
however, and accompanied by tremendous technical and chemical advances in medicine, 
there is no consensus on what is considered normative or obligatory in the sphere of 
medical ethics and practice.8  Conscientious objection has shifted from the military to 
medical practitioners.   Both courts and legislatures have struggled to find a means of 
accommodating the moral objections of many medical practitioners to the demands 
                                                          
6 Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution (Princeton, N.J. :: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
7 Robert D. Putnam, David E. Campbell, and Shaylyn Romney Garrett, American Grace: How Religion 
Divides and Unites Us, 1st Simon & Schuster hardcover ed. ed. (New York :: Simon & Schuster, 2010). 
8 Carol Levine, Taking Sides. Clashing Views on Bioethical Issues, 12th ed. ed., Mcgraw-Hill 




placed on them.  These demands originate in the actual or perceived needs of patients 
who expect to benefit from the practices, procedures, and drugs that modern medicine 
can deliver.9  Access to these practices may even be deemed a fundamental constitutional 
right.  In other cases, access might be expected because of a statutory obligation or 
because of a customary or codified duty of care to which all medical professionals are 
expected to adhere.  Should all medical practitioners comply with all patient demands and 
expectations?  In an increasingly regulated policy sphere, should all medical practitioners 
comply with all statutory or regulatory demands or standards?   What if those demands 
conflict with professional ethical obligations?   If these interests are fundamental and 
absolute, which absolute right is to be protected – that of the medical practitioner or the 
patient?  If these interests can be balanced, what should be the balancing test?   Should 
the test be constitutional?  Should it be determined by legislatures?   
     After the 1990 Oregon v. Smith decision in which the Supreme Court abruptly and 
fundamentally changed its prior balancing test for free exercise, reducing the protection 
for religious practice, many jurisdictions, federal as well as state, responded with 
“religious freedom restoration acts” or “conscience clauses” in an attempt to legislatively 
restore the test the Supreme Court had recently abandoned.10  However, not all states did.  
What accounts for the differences?  Why did some states pass such legislation, while 
other states did not?  What were the factors that led to the protection of medical 
conscientious objection in some states but not in others?  What was the public opinion of 
the state, and how, if at all, was this opinion translated into policy, such as legislation?  
                                                          
9 John F. Peppin et al., Religious Perspectives in Bioethics, Annals of Bioethics;  (London: Taylor & 
Francis, 2004). 




Further, if those factors which led to adoption or rejection of balancing tests for 
conscientious objection can be identified, can any suggestions be made about protection 
of conscience if the demographic factors which influenced or caused or were necessary 
for that protection change over time? 
Organization of the Thesis 
     My thesis will address these questions and will be divided into two main parts.  First, I 
will address the federal legal and constitutional background of conscientious objection, 
including an evaluation of positive law such as statutes.  My approach here will be 
primarily legal and historical, and will examine both constitutional law and the Federal 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act.  Second, I will address how in large measure the 
protection of conscientious objection shifted to the states, and how the states protected 
conscientious objectors with legislation such as Religious Freedom Restoration Acts 
(RFRAs), or protected other interests by either not enacting RFRAs or by enacting 
legislation which specifically precluded the possibility of conscientious objection by 
medical practitioners.   
     There is a great deal of material on the ethical obligations of medical professionals 
written by medical professionals and ethicists.  There is a vast quantity of material 
produced by lawyers evaluating the current state of the law, or advocating on behalf of a 
particular status quo or for changes.  There is a good amount of political science literature 
on how public (or even elite) opinion translates into or causes public policy, such as 
legislation.  I will review this literature.  Very little research, however, examined the 
impact of religious demographic factors and public opinion in states on the adoption of 
 6 
 
conscience protecting legislation such as religious freedom restoration acts.  This is a 
significant hole in political science research that this thesis will begin to fill.  
Methods, Data, and Theories 
     The overall framework for the thesis is to examine the development of legal protection 
for medical conscientious objection and to measure some possible factors which 
contribute or relate to its legal protection.  In particular, I will test the relationship 
between the size and characteristics of a religious constituency and the enactment of a 
RFRA.  This is a general relationship which does not specifically focus on a medical right 
of conscientious objection.  RFRAs cover much more than conscientious objection, and 
much more than medical conscientious objection.  
     Conversely, I will test the relationship between the size of a secular constituency and 
the enactment of “must fill” pharmacy or medical practices.  This is a much more precise 
relationship because it specifically focuses on policy outcomes affecting medical 
practitioners rather than the much broader class of conscientious objectors generally.  
     I theorize that public opinion will be reflected in public policy.  The more specific and 
the more widespread or common the opinion, the more direct its reflection in policy.  In 
this case, the dependent variables are the enactment of a state RFRA and the enactment a 
“must fill” pharmacy policy.    
     I hypothesize that the more religious the constituency, the more likely there will be a 
RFRA.  Conversely, the more secular the constituency, the less likely there will be a 
RFRA and the more likely there will be a “must fill” pharmacy directive.   
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     H1: The more religious characteristics a constituency has, as measured by frequency 
of prayer, belief in the Bible as the Word of God, belief that religion is important, and 
belief that religion is the primary source of guidance in determining right and wrong, the 
greater the likelihood of there being a RFRA.  
     H2: Conversely, the less these characteristics are present, the more likely the state will 
have a “must fill” requirement.  
     H3: In particular, the greater the frequency in the belief that religion is the primary 
source of determining right from wrong, the greater the likelihood of there being a 
RFRA.  
     H4: The greater the number of evangelicals or Roman Catholics in a constituency, the 
greater the likelihood of there being a RFRA.   
     H5: Conversely, the greater the number of respondents who identify themselves as 
“Unaffiliated” in a constituency, the less likely it is the state will have a RFRA.  
     H6: The greater the number of Unaffiliated, the more likely there will be a must fill 
requirement.  
     H7: The greater the expenditure of funds by Planned Parenthood in a given state, the 
more likely the state will have a “must fill” requirement.   This hypothesis is an attempt 
to measure the effect an interest group might have on enactment of a specific policy.  
     I recognize the limitations of using sample sizes of N=22 (for RFRA states) and N=8 
(for must fill states) for analysis, but even the small class can, nonetheless, help in an 
evaluation of these factors, however qualified the findings must be.   Further, I use the 
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“must fill” criterion because this is a significant and measurable flash point in medical 
conscientious objection.   A “must fill” requirement means that a pharmacist, when 
presented with a valid prescription for a pill intended to cause a chemically induced 
abortion up to 49 days of gestation, is legally obliged to fill that prescription under 
penalty of law, loss of job, and revocation of license, regardless of any moral scruples.11   
Of course, any other prescription must be filled as well.  
  For the first, federally oriented part of the thesis, I will note national religious trends 
using American National Election Study (ANES) data from 1992-2012 and sometimes 
earlier.  For the second, state oriented part of the thesis, I will measure these relationships 
using public opinion by state using Pew’s recently released “Religious Landscape” data 
which can assess both national opinion and state level opinion.   
     I will operationalize “religiosity” and “secularism” with well-established and 
commonly (but not universally) used measures of religiosity such as “belief, belonging, 
and behaving” measures.  For belief, I use how important the respondent views religion, 
how authoritative is the guidance the respondent receives from his or her religion, and 
how authoritative the respondent views the Bible.  For belonging, I use measures of 
denominational or religious grouping self-identification, particularly with respect to 
evangelicals and Roman Catholics and for non-affiliated respondents.  For behaving, I 
use how frequently the respondent prays.  
                                                          
11 See the January, 2015 Planned Parenthood fact sheet on “Mifepristone, also known as medication 
abortion or “the abortion pill” (formerly known as RU-486)… which induces abortion when administered 
in early pregnancy, providing women with an alternative to aspiration (suction) abortion.”  Accessed on 




     I also examine some other variables which might plausibly explain why a state RFRA 
or “must fill” requirement is enacted.  For example, interest groups expenditures in a 
given state might affect policy enactment by creating visibility for their cause, generating 
good will from potential customers, cementing support among actual customers, or from 
actual education or lobbying efforts.  I use two such variables here, Planned Parenthood 
expenditures, and Right to Life or Pro-life expenditures.   These are measured in dollars 
spent per state resident.  Finally, to provide a partisan identification measure, I use the 





















CHAPTER TWO: THE LEGAL AND FEDERAL FRAMEWORK 
Historical Background to First Amendment Protection 
     There is a broad consensus that America is a nation full of religious believers, that this 
influences public policy, and that many of its legal norms recognize and, at least to some 
degree, accommodate, protect, or even defer to this fact.  This was true at its initial 
colonial settlement, at its founding and framing, and continues to a remarkable degree 
today, and is recognized by historians, political scientists, and the academic legal 
community.  Typical of such recognition are law professor Ahkil Reed Amar in his 
analysis of the Bill of Rights and its antecedents,12 law scholar Kent Greenaway in his 
study of religion and the Constitution,13 and standard reference works such as The 
Encyclopedia of American Civil Rights and Liberties14.   Amar and others note that at the 
time the Constitution was ratified, six states had established Christian churches which 
continued under the Federal constitution, and eleven had some type of Christian religious 
qualification for office holders.15  And the denizens were rather pugnacious.  There were 
many wars, small and large.  Yet despite the frequency of war, military conscientious 
                                                          
12 Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 
1998). 
13 Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution. 
14 Otis H. Stephens, Jr., John M. Scheb, II, and Kara Elizabeth Stooksbury, Encyclopedia of American Civil 
Rights and Liberties (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2006). 
15 Amar, The Bill of Rights : Creation and Reconstruction. 33.   
 11 
 
objection was recognized quite early.16  Indeed, legal scholar and historian Louis Fisher 
chronicles how military conscientious objection was largely synonymous with 
“conscientious objection” for decades, and existed prior to more general notions of 
religious liberty or religious pluralism.17  
      Scholars are also agreed that neither the political branches nor the courts of the new 
nation were particularly solicitous of religious liberty for nearly 100 years, although some 
standard constitutional law texts such as Epstein’s Constitutional Law For a Changing 
America may ignore this and concentrate almost exclusively on 20th century cases.18  To 
a large degree this was because there were so few constraints on beliefs and practices, in 
part because of limited federal jurisdiction, and in part because of a consensus of a good 
deal of religious thought.  But it was also because so many fact situations that would be 
covered under the “religious liberty” rubric occurred in a state law context.  Accordingly, 
federal courts did not address the issue.  There does not seem to be much scholarly 
dispute about this broad historical, cultural, and legal context.  Both earlier and current 
editions of Epstein’s constitutional law text reflect what is standard treatment.19    
Pre-Smith Jurisprudence 
      The impetus for the Supreme Court’s first decision was an 1862 federal law making 
bigamy criminal, targeting Mormons, and applicable in the territories of the United 
States.  No territory could be admitted to the Union unless polygamy was outlawed.  Of 
                                                          
16 Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution.  See vol.1, chapter 4, on “Conscientious Objection to Military 
Service”.  In a land full of English dissenters and nonconformists, military conscientious objection was 
permitted as early as the 17th century.  
17 Fisher, Religious Liberty in America : Political Safeguards. 
18 Lee Epstein and Thomas G. Walker, Constitutional Law for a Changing America. Rights, Liberties, and 
Justice, Ninth Edition. ed. (Thousand Oaks, California: CQ Press, 2016). 
19 Constitutional Law for a Changing America. Institutional Powers and Constraints, 5th ed. ed. 
(Washington, D.C: CQ Press, 2004). 
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course, polygamy was practiced by Mormons and this was a significant sanction against 
an essential tenet.  In Reynolds v. U.S., an 1879 case, the Court upheld the law, making a 
distinction between “action” and “belief” which continued in its jurisprudence.20 The 
issue before the Court was “whether religious belief can be accepted as a justification of 
an overt act made criminal by the law of the land” and the answer was a unanimous “no.”  
The Court opined that “Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they 
cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.”21  
     Standard treatments from Reynolds to Smith note the gradual extension of free 
exercise protection to religiously and then morally based behavior, and how selective and 
then complete incorporation of the federal constitution’s first amendment protections 
were applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.  Amar, Bertelsen, Drinan, 
Fisher, Gill, Greenawalt, Stephens and Witte, representing political scientists, historians, 
and legal scholars all agree on the main points of this narrative.22  Along the way 
conscientious objection was recognized as a subset of belief and behavior that was 
accorded some legal protection under the “free exercise” language of the First 
Amendment.  
                                                          
20 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879). One good way of accessing Supreme Court cases is via 
the Chicago Kent School of Law website at https://www.oyez.org/cases/2015  which is often superior to the 
Supreme Court’s own website.  
21 Reynolds, supra, at 164.  Although it did not base its opinion on this rationale, the Court also noted that 
“Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and western nations of Europe, and, until the 
establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African 
people.”  
22 Amar, The Bill of Rights : Creation and Reconstruction; Soledad Bertelsen, "Conscientious Objection : 
Lessons from the Experience of the United States" (2011); "Conscientious Objection of Health Care 
Providers: Lessons from the Experience of the United States," Notre Dame J. Int'l & Comp. L. 3(2013); 
Robert F. Drinan and Jennifer I. Huffman, "The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: A Legislative 
History," Journal of Law and Religion 10, no. 2 (1993); Fisher, Religious Liberty in America : Political 
Safeguards; Anthony James Gill, The Political Origins of Religious Liberty, Cambridge Studies in Social 
Theory, Religion, and Politics; Cambridge Studies in Social Theory, Religion, and Politics.  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008); Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution; Stephens, Scheb, and 
Stooksbury, Encyclopedia of American Civil Rights and Liberties; John Witte, Religion and the American 
Constitutional Experiment : Essential Rights and Liberties (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 2000). 
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     In Cantwell v. Connecticut, Jehovah’s Witnesses were convicted of soliciting funds 
without a license while distributing religious materials.   The Court struck down the 
convictions, noting the severe burden on the religious practices, the discretionary nature 
of officials in granting licenses (the official could determine which speech or religious 
practice would be permitted), and applying First Amendment protections to the states for 
the first time.23  In a 1961 case, Braunfeld v. Brown, the Court considered Sunday closing 
laws as applied to Orthodox Jews.24   The case is significant for the various tests for 
constitutionality proposed by several members of the Court, all of whom were seeking 
some sort of balancing test between the governmental interest and the burdened religious 
interests of the litigants.  
     These tests for constitutionality were further refined and then settled in two other 
cases.  In Sherbert v. Verner, a Seventh Day Adventist was denied unemployment 
benefits because she refused to work on Saturdays, her Sabbath.25  The Court held for the 
Adventist and against the state using a balancing test that weighed how significant the 
burden was on the religious practice with how compelling the governmental interest was.  
Thus, if the burden on free exercise was “substantial”, and if the governmental interest 
was not “compelling”, the law would fail constitutional review.  The law would be 
upheld only if the governmental interest was compelling.  In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
Wisconsin’s public policy required children to attend public school until they were 16.  
This conflicted with the pervasive religious practices and way of life of the Amish, who 
formally schooled their children only through grade eight and did so outside of public 
                                                          
23 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
24 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
25 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
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schools.    The Court held for the Amish, finding that their free exercise of religion was 
burdened, and that the state’s interest in “developing citizens and members of society” 
was significant but not sufficient enough to warrant the burden, and also noting that the 
Amish seemed to be producing productive members of society without Wisconsin’s 
assistance or compulsion.26      
     The cases above are all clearly “free exercise” cases.  However, the analysis is not 
limited to those cases in which a particular, historical “religious belief or practice” is 
implicated.  The Court applied similar analysis in military conscientious objector cases.  
Of course, in these cases the Court reviewed Vietnam era federal conscription and student 
benefits laws rather than state laws.  The Court held that statutory exemptions from 
military service must also cover, e.g., those who hold fundamental philosophical or moral 
objections to war, not only those with a particularly “religious” objection to participation 
in war.27   In Johnson v. Robison, the Court reviewed a federal law which distinguished 
between veterans who served on active duty and those conscientious objectors who 
performed alternative service.  The law granted education benefits to the former, but 
denied them to the latter.  The Court applied its balancing test, determining that there was 
little if any burden on the conscientious objector’s free exercise, and thus upheld the 
law.28   
     The status of First Amendment analysis was thus developed over decades and the test 
itself was fairly clear, however difficult it might be to actually apply in any given fact 
situation.  Whether applied to federal law or to state law via the Fourteenth Amendment, 
                                                          
26 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).  
27 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).  
28 Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974).  
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the constitution required a balancing test between the religious practice (or fundamental 
philosophy) of a person, and the interest of the government in burdening that religious 
practice.  The less burdened the religion, the more likely the law was constitutional.  The 
less compelling the governmental interest, the more likely the law was unconstitutional.  
Legislators at the federal and state level were to balance the interests and enact legislation 
accordingly.29  There was a broad consensus of judicial, legislative, and scholarly opinion 
that the religious interests of a person are to be balanced against the legitimate interests of 
the government when enacting and reviewing legislation.   If such a balance was not 
found in the legislation itself, and sometimes even if it was, a balance would be made in 
any judicial review of that legislation for constitutionality.30  
     In 1990, however, that all changed.  
Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith and a Changing Constitutional Standard 
     Alfred Smith was a drug counselor in a drug rehabilitation organization.  He was also 
a member of the Native American Church.  As part of that Church’s sacramental 
activities, he ingested peyote.  It was his religious duty.  He was fired from his job.  
When he applied for unemployment benefits, Oregon denied his claim for compensation 
because ingesting peyote was a criminal offense in Oregon.  He appealed, claiming inter 
                                                          
29 And legislators did.  Legislation which survives from that era continues to use a balancing test. For 
example, Civil Rights legislation and regulations addressing religious liberty in the federal workplace 
typically rely on a balancing test in which the religious practices and interests must be afforded “reasonable 
accommodation”, which involves a balancing of the interests of the religious practitioner with the needs of 
the federal (or state) agency in its employment practices.   
30 John Nowak, Constitutional Law (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Company, 1978).  See particularly 
chapters 18 and 19 on free speech and freedom of religion, respectively.  
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alia that his First Amendment Free Exercise rights had been violated by the state’s denial 
of benefits.31    
     Up to this point, the case presented itself as a class example of First Amendment (and 
conscientious objection) analysis.  The state of the law was that a government restriction 
on religious liberty – a “substantial burden” on the exercise of one’s religion - must be 
based on a compelling state interest, and narrowly drawn to accomplish that interest.  By 
analogy to other First Amendment protections of such rights as speech or assembly, that 
“narrowly drawn” legislation must be the “least restrictive” available to the governmental 
entity, a very high standard.  If that standard had been used with Mr. Smith, the case 
would have involved an analysis of how central smoking peyote was to Mr. Smith’s 
religion.  If the prohibition was indeed a “significant burden” on his religious practice, 
then the court would have balanced this free exercise interest against how compelling the 
government’s interest was in outlawing peyote, and perhaps how narrowly drawn the 
criminal statute was.   If the government’s interest was compelling and was narrowly 
drawn, the denial of unemployment compensation benefits would stand.   
     The Smith case fundamentally changed that approach and that standard.   Although 
there is a broad consensus as to what happened, there is sharp disagreement among 
scholars as to whether the Court’s move in a new direction was good policy. The Smith 
Court held that a generally applicable, facially neutral statute which does not overtly 
discriminate against a particular religion passes constitutional muster, regardless of how 
severe a burden it places on a religious practice.  In fact, such a law can completely 
                                                          
31 Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  These facts are recited in the opinion.  Smoking peyote was also 
a federal criminal offense. Oregon had simply adopted the federal drug schedule for prohibited substances, 
which is common.  
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eliminate a required religious practice.  Mr. Smith would get no balancing test analysis. 
There would be no inquiry as to how central to his religion smoking peyote was.  There 
would be no inquiry into how important, much less “compelling” this law was to Oregon 
or the United States.  If the law outlawed peyote, applied to everyone, and did not 
intentionally target a particular group such as the Native American Church, the law 
would stand.  With one case the Court swept away decades of First Amendment 
precedent and analysis.  Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, opined: 
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a 
relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that 
unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in 
which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance 
of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.32 
 
     Christopher Lund accurately portrays this change as fundamental,33 and this view is 
reflected in standard works such as Epstein’s Constitutional Law text.34  This 
interpretation is the consensus interpretation, but is not universal.  Marci Hamilton 
represents the extreme, distinctly minority wing of those who defend Smith.35  She does 
so, however, only by claiming that it was the earlier Supreme Court decisions which were 
aberrations, not Smith.36 Her claim, echoing the claim of Justice Scalia, is that the use of a 
different test idolizes individual conscience above all else, and cannot be limited.  If the 
pre-Smith tests for statutory validity are maintained, how can the state and society prevent 
                                                          
32 Smith at 890. 
33 Lund, "Religious Liberty after Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs." 
34 Epstein and Walker, Constitutional Law for a Changing America. Rights, Liberties, and Justice. 
35 Marci Hamilton, God Vs. The Gavel : Religion and the Rule of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005).  Although distinctly a minority opinion, Hamilton represents powerful legal interests and she 
successfully argued the Boerne case which invalidated the Federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act as it 
applied to the states.  
36 Marci A. Hamilton, "The Case for Evidence-Based Free Exercise Accommodation: Why the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act Is Bad Public Policy," Harvard Law & Policy Review 9, no. 1 (2015). 
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an individual’s conscience from invalidating nearly any statute?37  Hadn’t the dictates of 
the individual conscience been made nearly unassailable?38  The Figure below indicates 
how the Employment Division v. Smith case changed the nature of Free Exercise analysis 
and litigation.  
Figure 1:  Standards of Review
 
     The Supreme Court has had other opportunities to review free exercise claims but has 
not overruled Smith.  At the same time, its First Amendment jurisprudence has continued 
with respect to free speech or freedom of assembly, and it continues to use balancing tests 
                                                          
37 Still, the Court’s decision came as quite a surprise both to court observers and other members.  Justice 
Blackmun noted in his dissent that “Until today, I thought this was a settled and inviolate principle of the 
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.  The majority, however, perfunctorily dismisses it as a 
‘constitutional anomaly.’”   
38
 Raymond Tatalovich and Byron W. Daynes, Moral Controversies in American Politics, 3rd ed.  (Armonk, 
N.Y.:  M.E. Sharpe, 2005).  Professor Jelen in his chapter on “God or Country” notes at p. 159 that this 




in those contexts.  Thus, the Court’s treatments of “free exercise” and “free speech” are 
going in different directions.  The Court affords “free exercise” claims less protection 
than “free speech” claims.39     Accordingly, any attempt to restore a balancing test would 
come from the federal or state legislatures.   
The Federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
     The legislative response was quick and decisive.  Drinan helpfully details the 
legislative history of the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)40.  RFRA 
was passed with overwhelming support in 1993, passing the House without objection and 
in the Senate 97-3.41  Hamilton also recounts how such a diverse conglomeration of 
interest groups, from the ACLU to the Catholic Conference, allied to press Congress for 
legislation that would restore the prior constitutional test for free exercise religious 
protection – and conscientious objection – in the form of legislation.42  While she decries 
it, scholars such as Douglas Laycock celebrate it.43  After all, if the Court could remove 
protection for religious or conscientious observance or behavior thorough an 
abandonment of a strict scrutiny standard of review, or any balancing test whatsoever, 
why could it not do the same regarding protected speech, assembly, or petitions? 
                                                          
39 The Court continues to use many different tests to evaluate whether an infringement or limitation on 
“free speech” rights is constitutional.  Among other criteria, it examines whether the speech is historically 
protected political speech, whether it is “commercial” speech, whether the limit on the speech was facially 
neutral with respect to “time, place, and manner” restrictions, whether the speech occurs in a public forum 
or on private property, and so on.  Most of these, however, include some balancing test between the 
interests involved.  There is some evidence that religious litigants may be shifting from a “free exercise” to 
a “free speech” approach to protect their interests.  See Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales.   
40 Drinan and Huffman, "The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: A Legislative History." 
41 Gerard V. Bradley, Challenges to Religious Liberty in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge ;: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012). Christopher Wolf in chapter 5 notes the overwhelming support and the 
broad coalition of both liberals and conservatives in passing RFRA.  
42 Hamilton, "The Case for Evidence-Based Free Exercise Accommodation: Why the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act Is Bad Public Policy." 
43 Douglas Laycock, "A Syllabus of Errors," Michigan Law Review 105, no. 6 (2007).  See also "The 
Remnants of Free Exercise," The Supreme Court Review 1990(1990).  Interestingly, both Hamilton and 
Laycock taught at the University of Texas Law School.   
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     I have found no scholar who supports an unfettered, absolutist position on the 
protection of conscience or religious practice.  Thus, there is no opposite number to 
Hamilton.  Laycock is typical of scholars who are broadly but not absolutely protective of 
First Amendment rights in general, and free exercise in particular.44  Louis Fisher notes, 
post-Smith, that although the Supreme Court occasionally protected free exercise claims, 
most protection has come from the political branches, and especially from Congress in 
the form of legislation.  The federal RFRA is just such a piece of legislation.45  
     The Federal RFRA is codified at 42 United States Code (U.S.C.) section 2000bb.  In 
it, Congress made findings and enacted legislation which are recorded below.46 
(a) FINDINGS  The Congress finds that – 
(1) the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion as an 
unalienable right, secured its protection in the First Amendment to the Constitution; 
(2) laws “neutral” toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws 
intended to interfere with religious exercise; 
(3) governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without compelling 
justification; 
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) the Supreme Court virtually 
eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise 
imposed by laws neutral toward religion; and 
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a workable 
test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior 
governmental interests. 
(b) PURPOSES  The purposes of this chapter are— 
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 
(1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in 
all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and 
(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially 
burdened by government. 
 
                                                          
44 "The Religious Freedom Restoration Act," Brigham Young University Law Review 1993, no. 1 (1993). 
45 Fisher, Religious Liberty in America : Political Safeguards. 
46 This citation is from the online version of the U.S. Code found at the Cornell University Law School site,    
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/2000bb%E2%80%931 accessed on March 9, 2016.  
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In 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-1, the legislation provided what Congress thought was the 
appropriate balancing test. 
(a) IN GENERAL  Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of 
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided 
in subsection (b) of this section. 
(b) EXCEPTION  Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion 
only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person— 
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 
     The law is nearly self-explanatory.  Congress perceived that the Supreme Court had 
changed long-standing precedent, and sought to protect the interests of free exercise by 
reinstating by statute what had been required by the Constitution until Smith.  It also 
established a “strict scrutiny” standard of review in which if a person’s “exercise of 
religion” is “substantially burdened” by a government interest, that interest must be 
“compelling” and the law must be “the least restrictive means” of furthering that 
compelling interest.   It does not require a particular outcome. It requires an analysis, 
balancing the interests involved.47   
     RFRA is not the only federal legislation to protect conscientious objectors, but it is the 
broadest.  Indeed, RFRA is a general statute which is intended to cover free exercise 
whether it arises from the cases of a federal employee whose religion requires a head 
scarf even when making a photo identification card, an employee of the NIH or CDC 
who objects to the introduction of viruses (live or dead) in the form of vaccinations, a 
man whose religion requires a particular diet even in an institutionalized setting, a student 
in a federal (or federally funded) school who refuses to recite the Pledge of Allegiance 
either because it pledges fealty to something other than God or because it mentions and 
                                                          
47 By requiring “strict scrutiny”, however, RFRA does place a finger on the scale when balancing equities.  
There is a quip that when a law is evaluated with “strict scrutiny”, “It is strict in theory, but fatal in 
practice.”  But so is much other legislation when dealing with civil liberties.  
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invokes the Deity, and innumerable other instances.  Other statutes, however, provide 
more specific protection for conscientious objectors and even for medical conscientious 
objectors. 
     In this arena no issues are more divisive and contentious than abortion or participation 
in life ending practices.  The Church Amendments, named after Senator Frank Church, 
amended the Public Health Service Act in 1973 to protect conscientious objectors if they 
were otherwise required to participate in the fundamental right the Supreme Court had 
just announced in Roe v. Wade.  Federally funded health care workers cannot be lawfully 
fired, disciplined, or otherwise discriminated against for refusing to participate in 
practices “that would be contrary to one’s religious convictions or moral beliefs.”   The 
protection even extended to institutions, such as Roman Catholic hospitals.48    Federal 
prison personnel and prosecutors are protected from having to participate in executions 
pursuant to a 1994 law that exempts them “if contrary to their moral or religious 
convictions.”49  There are many other such “conscience clause” federal statutes.50  
Post-RFRA Jurisprudence 
     Federal constitutional protections apply to everyone, of course, and require 
compliance from nearly everyone – from the federal government, from state 
governments, local and municipal governments, and anything funded with federal dollars; 
                                                          
48 The 1973 Church Amendments to the Public Health Service Act are codified at 42 USC section 300a-7.   
49 18 USC 3597(b).   Interestingly, title 18 is the federal criminal code.  These “conscience provisions” are 
scattered throughout the federal code.  An excellent list of national and international laws can be found at 
the website of consciencelaws.org, accessed on March 9, 2016 at  
http://www.consciencelaws.org/law/laws/usa.aspx  
50 Some others, particularly health-care related, can be found at the HHS website at 
http://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/for-individuals/conscience-protections/factsheet/index.html  accessed on 




and federal constitutional protections prevail over any other inconsistent provision, 
whether federal legislation or regulations, state constitutions or laws, local ordinances, 
and so on.  Further, federal constitutional protection is generally considered more stable 
than federal legislation, which can be changed whenever parties or ideologies in 
Congress and the White House adjust their seats and representation proportionately.   
     One other case needs to be mentioned before proceeding to an examination of two 
significant post-RFRA cases.  This case shows that even after Smith and before the 
passage of the federal RFRA, the Court declined to eliminate all protection for free 
exercise activity and defer absolutely to the political branches and states.  
     Santeria is an Afro-Caribbean religion which includes as part of its rites animal 
sacrifice.  The animal’s throat is cut and then it is usually eaten.  When the city of 
Hialeah, Florida discovered that a Santeria Church was going to be established, it passed 
a city ordinance forbidding the possession of animals intended for sacrifice or slaughter 
unless otherwise exempt because of the possession of a state permit.  Regular slaughter 
houses or butchers would have such a permit.  This was a severe burden on the free 
exercise of Santeria.  In 1993, the year RFRA was passed, a unanimous Court held that 
such an ordinance was unconstitutional.  It was not generally applicable nor neutral – it 
targeted a specific group.  Accordingly, the ordinance failed even the weak Smith 
constitutional test.51      
      The federal RFRA purported to govern both federal and state legislative restrictions 
on free exercise, and on state constitutional restrictions on free exercise, imposing a 
                                                          
51 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).   
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“strict scrutiny” test for any law to pass constitutional muster.52  The Supreme Court 
reviewed the federal RFRA in two significant cases.  A Roman Catholic Church wanted 
to build onto its existing structure.  A local city ordinance required doing this in such a 
way – consistent with the historic and architecturally significant nature of that part of the 
city – that the building project would not be possible or would be exorbitantly expensive.  
The Church sued, alleging a violation of the federal RFRA because its free exercise had 
been significantly burdened by this local ordinance.  In the 1997 decision City of Boerne 
v. Flores
53 the Court held for the City, opining that the federal RFRA did not apply to 
state or local laws, only federal laws, agencies, and programs.  The ordinance was 
generally applicable and the City’s interest may have been compelling, but the Court did 
not need to address those issues because it opined that RFRA did not limit what state or 
municipal laws might do, even with respect to free exercise claims.   
     The Boerne case is significant for at least two reasons.  First, it eliminated federal law 
applicability with respect to free exercise claims at the state and local level, where most 
alleged burdens occur.  If an aggrieved person perceives a burden on his or her free 
exercise, he or she cannot use either federal constitutional law (post-Smith) nor federal 
statutory law (post-Boerne) nor federal courts to challenge that burden on free exercise if 
the burden arises from state or local action except in very narrow circumstances.  
Secondly, it made clear that if any remedies for state or local burdens on free exercise 
                                                          
52 Congress also passed a watered down law, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
during the Clinton Administration.  It covers prisoners and institutions, inter alia, and thus is beyond the 
scope of this thesis.   Its passage was much more troubled than was the RFRA, and there was not such a 
legislative consensus.  
53 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).  Professors Hamilton and Laycock are intellectual 
opponents over most things regarding the free exercise clause.  Professor Hamilton, a severe critic of 
RFRAs, successfully argued the Boerne case before the Supreme Court, just as Professor Laycock, a 
libertarian and advocate for liberty of all types, and an ardent advocate of RFRAs, had successfully argued 
the Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye case four years earlier.   
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were to be made available, they could only be provided by state or local law.  Thus, just 
as the Smith case generated a federal RFRA, so the Boerne case generated state RFRAs.    
     The third significant post-Smith case from the Court interpreted the federal RFRA as 
applied to federal action.  In a strange case of déjà vu, a “Spiritist Church” with roots in 
Brazil and 130 members in the U.S. requires its members to drink a sacramental tea with 
hoacsa, which contains a hallucinogen proscribed by federal law.   This was a post-
RFRA, 2006 case.  The Court reviewed the case using the standards of the federal RFRA.  
Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Roberts applied the RFRA balancing test; 
found that the members of the Church were required to participate in this “communion”; 
that rendering this act illegal was a significant burden on Church members; and that the 
governmental interest in proscribing the drug in all circumstances was not compelling; 
and held for the Church members against federal law enforcement agencies.54     
     Thus, while the Court in Smith did not protect such activity as a matter of 
constitutional law, the Court in Gonzales enthusiastically and unanimously applied the 
statutory RFRA test in striking down other federal legislation.  Ironically, however, most 
state drug codes are based on the federal schedules of prohibited substances.  
Accordingly, while Church members could not be prosecuted under federal law, they 
could continue to be prosecuted under state law by state prosecutors.  A federal 
constitutional test would have covered all circumstances.  A federal RFRA test is only 
applicable to federal cases.  Church members would only have some semblance of 
protection – would only get a balancing test – if the state had also adopted a RFRA or 
otherwise provided for free exercise or conscience protection.   In effect, notwithstanding 
                                                          
54 Gonzales v. O Centro Espierita Beneficente Uniao do Vegatal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).  Ironically, the 
Smith case also dealt with drugs used in a religious rite.  
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a “win” at the Supreme Court, Church members could still face prosecution if they 
participated in their hallucinogenic sacrament.  
Subsequent and Other Statutory and Regulatory Developments 
     RFRA was not enacted in a vacuum, and was neither the first nor the last federal law 
to attempt to protect religious expression.  One law which protects free exercise was 
passed in the 1960s.  Another, which largely maintained conscience protection for 
individuals but changed it drastically for institutions, was enacted in 2010.  Both were 
implemented with an extensive regulatory scheme.  These laws will now be examined in 
turn.  
     One of the most important laws providing for federal accommodation of religious 
practice is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  The law includes a federal statute, 
federal regulations for enforcement in the private sector and in federal agencies, 
investigative and enforcement mechanisms with the Equal Opportunity Employment 
Commission for the private sector, and federal agencies’ own mini-EEOC entities for 
investigation and enforcement within each federal agency.   The codifiers of the U.S. 
Code considered RFRA to address a civil rights issue and codified it at 42 USC chapter 
21B.  The codifiers placed the Civil Rights Act at 42 USC Chapter 21.  
     The basic statute provides, among other things, that  
       §2000e–2. Unlawful employment practices 
        (a) Employer practices 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin; or 
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(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any 
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such 
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.55  (Emphasis added) 
 
     The implementing regulations make clear that the law prohibits not merely “religious” 
discrimination, but also discrimination based on one’s ethical or moral beliefs.  At 29 
Code of Federal Regulations Part 1605, the EEOC defines and explains “religious 
discrimination” in its generally applicable regulations, which cover the private sector.   
The basic rule is that “[It is] an unlawful employment practice under section 703(a)(1) [of 
the Civil Rights Act] for an employer to fail to reasonably accommodate the religious 
practices of an employee or prospective employee, unless the employer demonstrates that 
accommodation would result in undue hardship on the conduct of its business.56  The 
regulations generally address specific topics such as hiring and promotions, scheduling 
accommodations, attire and grooming, and other common issues.57   
     EEOC regulations are applicable both in the private sector and in the public sector. 
The particular regulation cited above is applicable in the private sector.  Each federal 
agency has its own EEO regulations which govern EEO practice in that particular agency, 
but which must be consistent with general EEO law.  For example, the Department of 
State has internal policies which govern what it somewhat oddly calls “discriminatory 
harassment” on the basis of the usual civil rights categories of race, gender, age, 
                                                          
55 42 USC 2000e-2, accessed on March 12, 2016 at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2014-
title42/html/USCODE-2014-title42-chap21-subchapVI-sec2000e-2.htm  
56 29 CFR 1605.2, accessed on March 14, 2016 at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2011-title29-
vol4/xml/CFR-2011-title29-vol4-part1605.xml  
57 These matters are addressed in the generally applicable federal regulation itself.  The EEOC webpage 
contains helpful summaries and links to most of the actual legal authorities.  The EEOC webpage on 




disability, religion, and so on.  The aggrieved person can pursue remedies through the 
agency apparatus created to ensure EEO policies are complied with, such as through its 
Office of Civil Rights.58  As a relatively small agency, the State Department does not 
have a robust regulatory scheme for addressing discrimination in the workplace.  Indeed, 
its “reasonable accommodation” website addresses only disability issues and not, e.g., 
religious discrimination.59   Larger federal agencies such as the Department of Defense 
have much more developed policies and regulatory investigative and enforcement 
structures.60  
     Finally, although it does not have the force and effect of a generally applicable 
regulation or agency regulation, the EEOC webpage has an illuminating gloss on 
regulatory interpretation which shows, in part, the ideological and enforcement emphases 
and priorities of different presidential administrations.   The current webpage, e.g., retains 
the phrase “undue hardship”, but also has the following description of what EEO law 
provides:   
The law requires an employer or other covered entity to reasonably accommodate an 
employee's religious beliefs or practices, unless doing so would cause more than a 
minimal burden on the operations of the employer's business. This means an employer 
may be required to make reasonable adjustments to the work environment that will allow 
an employee to practice his or her religion.
61
 (Emphasis added.)  
                                                          
58 See, e.g., the State Department policies and investigatory and resolution structure at 
http://www.state.gov/s/ocr/c24959.htm accessed on March 14,2016.  
59  See its “Reasonable Accommodation Policy”, accessed on March 14, 2016 at  
http://www.state.gov/s/ocr/c24975.htm  
60    Department of Defense Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity website, accessed on 
March 14, 2016 at  http://diversity.defense.gov/About.aspx   See also Defense Department Directive 
1020.02E, Diversity Management and EO in the DoD, June 8, 2015, accessed on March 14, 2016 at 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/102002E.pdf  
61 EEOC webpage describing “Religious Discrimination and Workplace Accommodation”, accessed on 
March 14, 2016 at http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/religion.cfm  The EEOC also tracks the number and 
resolution of religion complaints which is accessible at  
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/religion.cfm  The number of cases soared in the federal 
fiscal years for the first Obama term.  Of course, these numbers do not indicate that cases are well-founded, 




     Compare this language with how the EEOC describes the burden of proof and analysis 
in racial discrimination cases.   Although the statutory language is the same and there is 
no statutory reason to distinguish between the different categories of protected persons, 
the EEOC makes such distinctions.  Compared to its analysis of religious discrimination 
cases, its treatment of racial cases is much more robust and aggressive.   
Race discrimination involves treating someone … unfavorably because he/she is of a 
certain race or because of personal characteristics associated with race…[It] also can 
involve treating someone unfavorably because of a person’s connection with a race-
based organization or group… Discrimination can occur when the victim and the person 
who inflicted the discrimination are the same race or color. 
The law forbids discrimination when it comes to any aspect of employment, including 
hiring, firing, pay, job assignments, promotions, layoff, training, fringe benefits, and any 
other term or condition of employment. 
It is unlawful to harass a person because of that person’s race or color. Harassment can 
include, for example, racial slurs, offensive or derogatory remarks about a person's race 
or color, or the display of racially-offensive symbols…  
The harasser can be the victim's supervisor… a co-worker, or someone who is not an 
employee of the employer, such as a client or customer. 
An employment policy or practice that applies to everyone, regardless of race or color, 
can be illegal if it has a negative impact on the employment of people of a particular race 
or color and is not job-related and necessary to the operation of the business.
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There is no mention of a “more than minimal burden”.  The interpretation is much more 
expansive.  Discrimination can occur when the parties are of the same race and extends to 
racially offensive symbols and even to customers or business associates of a different 
business.  Finally, the last paragraph rejects the “facially neutral” analysis of the Smith 
decision and emphasizes that a generally applicable policy or practice that is not 
“necessary” for employment is discriminatory if it has a “negative impact.”   None of this 
language is duplicated under its “religion” analysis. 
                                                          





     Notwithstanding this agency gloss, however, complainants continue to pursue cases, 
and the EEOC occasionally pursues cases on their behalf.   In the case of Dynamic 
Medical Services, the EEO settled a case in which a private company was requiring its 
employees to attend classes and engage in Scientology religious practices, including 
prolonged staring at other people.   In an even more bizarre case, the EEOC won a jury 
trial in 2013 against a coal company that required its administrative employees to wear a 
biometric hand scanner so the company knew where they were and had been.  One 
employee objected to the hand scanner because he considered it a “mark of the beast”.  
The company refused to attempt any accommodation at all and the company lost.63 
     A more typical case made its way to the Supreme Court, where Justice Scalia, writing 
for the Court, held that Abercrombie and Fitch violated the Civil Rights Act when it did 
not hire a woman who interviewed while wearing a hijab. The Company asserted that to 
permit an employee to wear such garb would violate its “no cap” policy which helped 
insure the maintenance of the Company’s “Look.”   To permit the Muslim attire would 
not be consistent with the image the Company sought to maintain.  Again, no 
accommodation at all was made, let alone an attempt at reasonable accommodation. 64 
     Medical practitioners also use Title VII.  In a federal case a nurse who worked in a 
county hospital was terminated because she refused to perform duties associated with 
performing abortions.  She had informed her employer of her objections.  The employer 
made no effort to accommodate her religiously based objections and simply fired her.  
                                                          
63 These two cases are reported on the EEOC website.   The result in the coal company case may have been 
considerably different if the company had made any attempt at all to accommodate the employee’s 
sincerely held but very odd religious belief.   http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/9-25-13d.cfm    




The nurse prevailed under Title VII and on other grounds.65  In another case with a 
similar procedural posture, a nurse sued under Title VII for religious discrimination after 
she was terminated for refusing to participate in performing abortions.  The plaintiff had 
established a prima facie case by demonstrating that her removal was based on a refusal 
to perform duties based on a conscientious religion objection, but the court held that the 
defendant hospital had successfully met its burden by offering a reasonable 
accommodation to the plaintiff.  In this case, the hospital had offered her a lateral transfer 
to a position where she would not be assisting in performing abortions, and there was no 
evidence that this accommodation would be burdensome.   Accordingly, the court held 
that the removal was lawful and denied the plaintiff any remedy.66    
     The significant feature of these cases is that Title VII requires some obligation on the 
part of the employers to accommodate the free exercise claims of plaintiffs.  The 
obligation may be only slightly “more than minimal,” but a balancing of interests exists.   
Contrast this with the case of an employee in a non-RFRA state, North Carolina, who 
was discharged for refusing to get a flu vaccination.  The employee, who worked in a 
skilled nursing facility, was a Christian Scientist who had religious objections to 
receiving any organic material derived from pigs.  She was fired.  She appealed on the 
basis of religious discrimination.  She lost because, the court held, the employer was 
under no duty to provide her with any accommodation because the requirement to get the 
                                                          
65 Elaine L. Tramm v. Porter Memorial Hospital, U.S. District Court, N. D. Indiana, Civil No. H-87-355 
cited at 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16391 (1989).  




vaccine and the basis for her removal were legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons.   
The court did not need to balance anything. 67  
     Two other developments subsequent to the enactment of the federal RFRA bear 
mentioning.  After Smith it was apparent that any federal free exercise or conscientious 
objection relief must come from Congress, not the Supreme Court.  And after Boerne it 
was apparent that either state law or a newly adopted federal law must provide protection 
for, e.g., churches which are restricted by zoning regulations.  This resulted in the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000.68   Unlike the earlier 
RFRA, there was significant opposition to this law.  It pertains to institutions such as 
hospitals and universities more than individuals.   
     The second and much more significant development was the promulgation or 
enactment of federal regulations and new federal legislation.  Federal legislation is often 
not self-executing and relies on implementing regulations to accomplish its intended 
purpose.  The Bush Administration through the Department of Health and Human 
Services issued regulations strongly supportive of conscience exemptions from morally 
objectionable federally funded or controlled medical practices in its waning days in the 
White House.  The Obama Administration, perceiving that these regulations 
unnecessarily and unreasonably burdened women in their pursuit of reproductive medical 
services, almost immediately revoked them.69 
                                                          
67 Head v. Adams Farm Living, N.C. Court of Appeals reported in North Carolina Lawyers Weekly August 
27, 2015, accessed on March 21, 2016 at lexisnexis.  
68 42 USC section 2000cc (2000).  
69 Julie D. Cantor, "Conscientious Objection Gone Awry — Restoring Selfless Professionalism in 
Medicine," New England Journal of Medicine 360, no. 15 (2009). 
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     The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 also contains conscience 
provisions, although for the individual health care provider these are not as protective as 
the current HHS website would lead one to believe.70  It does provide, however, that a 
health care plan cannot discriminate against an individual health care provider for his or 
her refusal to perform or refer for abortions.  Otherwise, it attempts to maintain the status 
quo by providing that “Nothing in this Act shall be construed to have any effect on 
Federal laws regarding – (i) conscience protection; (ii) willingness or refusal to provide 
abortion; and (iii) discrimination on the basis of the willingness or refusal to provide, pay 
for, cover, or refer for abortion or to provide or participate in training to provide 
abortion.”71   So far as I have been able to determine it does not discuss conscience 
protection in other contexts.  Similarly, President Obama in Executive Order 13535 stated 
that  
Under the Act, longstanding Federal laws to protect conscience (such as the Church 
Amendment, 42 U.S.C. 300a-7, and the Weldon Amendment, section 508(d)(1) of Public 
Law 111-8) remain intact and new protections prohibit discrimination against health 
care facilities and health care providers because of an unwillingness to provide, pay 




What is a huge change is that the PPACA immediately required large, well established 
institutions representing millions of mainstream believers to conform to a new federal 
                                                          
70 P.L. 111-48, as amended by P.L. 111-152 (2010).  The original bill, containing 910 pages in PDF format, 
is available from the Government Publishing Office website at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-
111hr3590enr/pdf/BILLS-111hr3590enr.pdf  A HHS factsheet discussing “conscience clauses” in this and 
other federal health care legislation can be found at http://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/for-
individuals/conscience-protections/factsheet/index.html  accessed on March 9, 2016.  HHS speaks in terms 
of actively protecting consciences, but the law merely seeks to maintain the balance already struck in other 
federal legislation.  
71 See section 1303(b) of the PPACA.   
72 Executive Order 13535, March 24, 2010 accessed from the White House Press Office at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/executive-order-patient-protection-and-affordable-care-acts-
consistency-with-longst  on March 9, 2016.  
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law that they found morally repugnant.73   Although individual consciences were 
protected and worship assemblies were exempted, institutions such as colleges, 
companies, and convents were not.  Those are the legal disputes currently before 
federal courts and the Supreme Court.  While fascinating, they are beyond the scope of 




















                                                          





CHAPTER THREE:  MEDICAL CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION 
Literature Review 
     The struggles over medical conscientious objection have been noted extensively in the 
medical and legal literature, and hardly at all in political science or sociology literature.  
In the medical literature, the issue is usually framed as the dictates of a medical 
practitioner’s individual conscience and judgment vs. the patient’s right of access to 
constitutionally or legislatively authorized care.  In the legal literature, the issue is usually 
framed as a free exercise or liberty interest vs. the patient’s constitutional right of access 
to care.  Whose interest shall be burdened?  
     The issue is typically structured around three sources:  legislation, including RFRAs; 
regulations, including those regulations implementing federal medical provision laws; 
and medical ethics codes, which have national models but which are adopted by 
individual states, often with some modifications.   Bertelsen and Wurdock helpfully 
arrange the material and list the various federal conscience clauses which protect 
individual medical practitioners who object to particular medical practices, such as 
abortion, when there is a federal link to the funding of the medical program.74  Kelly 
                                                          
74 Bertelsen, "Conscientious Objection of Health Care Providers: Lessons from the Experience of the 
United States."; Stephanie M. Wurdock, "Doctors, Dioceses, and Decisions: Examining the Impact of the 
Catholic Hospital System and Federal Conscience Clauses on Medical Education," Pittsburgh Journal of 
Environmental and Public Health Law 6, no. 2 (2012).  Most of the literature also notes the promulgation 
of conscience protecting regulations under the Bush Administration, and the almost immediate revocation 
of those regulations and the substitution of others during the Obama Administration.   
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takes a remarkably cool, analytical approach and notes the issues, such as the firing of 
non-conforming pharmacists, without taking a strident, advocacy approach.75  
     The medical literature usually posits three alternatives:  an approach which defers to a 
medical practitioner’s judgment, an approach which purports to balance the interests 
involved, and an approach which requires conformity to law or what the proponent 
considers “accepted medical practice.” This standard approach is used by Card, a 
philosophy professor and medical ethicist who rejects the first two alternatives.76  I have 
found no medical practitioner who advocates for the first approach – the “anarchy” 
approach which is nonetheless used by its opponents for argumentative purposes, perhaps 
because attacking a straw man is easier than refuting a more nuanced approach.  Others 
lean toward an approach which protects the individual more often than not.  
     Wicclair is a prolific author, medical ethicist, and medical school teacher who favors a 
balancing approach that if translated into the legal terms of “compelling interest” and 
“substantial burden” looks remarkably like the RFRA’s balancing test.77   Significantly, 
however, he concludes that most medical practices or drugs would meet the “compelling 
interest” standard, which would permit the overruling of individual conscientious 
objections.  Thus, a pharmacist or physician must usually perform the practice or refer the 
                                                          
75 Eileen P. Kelly, Aimee Dars Ellis, and Susan P. S. Rosenthal, "Crisis of Conscience: Pharmacist Refusal 
to Provide Health Care Services on Moral Grounds," Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal 23, no. 
1 (2011). 
76 R. F. Card, "Conscientious Objection and Emergency Contraception," The American Journal of Bioethics 
: AJOB 7, no. 6 (2007). 
77 M. R. Wicclair, "Conscientious Objection in Medicine," Bioethics 14, no. 3 (2000); Mark R. Wicclair, 
"Pharmacies, Pharmacists, and Conscientious Objection," Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 16, no. 3 
(2006); "Is Conscientious Objection Incompatible with a Physician’s Professional Obligations?," 
Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics : Philosophy of Medical Research and Practice 29, no. 3 (2008); 
Conscientious Objection in Health Care : An Ethical Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2011); Mark Wicclair, "Managing Conscientious Objection in Health Care Institutions," HEC Forum 26, 
no. 3 (2014). 
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patient to another medical practitioner.78   Montgomery takes a position closer to Card, 
and is instructive in spite of, or perhaps because of, his British perspective.  Accordingly, 
he does not get bogged down in using thought or language structures dependent on an 
American judicial or legislative framework.  While acknowledging the claims of 
individual conscience, he concludes that mere “personal moralities” must generally give 
way to legitimate public expectations of the delivery of lawful medications and 
procedures.79   Cantor, both an attorney and a doctor, bemoans the “conscience creep,” 
suggests that those with sensitive consciences should not choose health care professions, 
and in one of the better lines in the debate, concludes that “Conscience is a burden that 
belongs to the individual professional; patients should not have to shoulder it.”80      
    On the other hand, Antommaria, another medical ethicist and medical school professor, 
is much more protective of the interests (if not the rights) of medical practitioners.81   
     The legal literature is also rather vituperative and is usually framed in terms of 
“rights” – rights of conscience (which, as we have seen, are incomplete and may be 
decreasing in number and importance) and the rights of patients. (As noted below, this 
“framing” is itself significant.  Even the medical practitioners tend to adopt it when 
analyzing the competing claims.)  What happens when a “free exercise” claim collides 
with “fundamental right to abortion” claim?  In my survey of the literature there appeared 
                                                          
78 Wicclair, Conscientious Objection in Health Care: An Ethical Analysis.  Wicclair thinks that both federal 
and state conscience clauses are at once too generous to and too severe on the individual conscience.  See 
Chapter 6.   
79 J. Montgomery, "Conscientious Objection: Personal and Professional Ethics in the Public Square," 
Medical Law Review 23, no. 2 (2015). Montgomery would try to accommodate individual conscience, but 
in an employment law context.  
80 Cantor, "Conscientious Objection Gone Awry — Restoring Selfless Professionalism in Medicine."  Dr. 
Cantor is also an adjunct law professor at UCLA, and has represented Planned Parenthood.  
81 Armand H. Matheny Antommaria, "The Proper Scope of Analysis of Conscientious Objection in 
Healthcare Individual Rights or Professional Obligations," Teaching Ethics 7, no. 1 (2006). 
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to be a greater quantity on the “pro-patient side”, but much of it was merely 
argumentative and based on absolutes or the nearly absolute.82  Accordingly, regardless 
of what test is used, the patient should have access to death inducing drugs or abortion 
inducing drugs or sterilization practices or whatever the patient is “entitled to.”  Typical 
of this approach are Vandewalker, who insists that individual conscience claims violate 
medical ethics and particularly informed consent rules,83  Lee, in an uneven law review 
article,84  Wurdock’s more even-handed treatment of moral conflicts in an institutional 
setting,85 and Scheu’s analysis of First Amendment objections to the Affordable Care 
Act’s individual mandate.86 Contrary perspectives were not as argumentative, except for 
Laycock and Whelen, and were fewer in number, but did at least balance interests.   
Whelen is vociferous in his analysis and condemnation of very aggressive Obama HHS 
regulations.87   
Professional Codes 
     Pharmacists as professional health care workers have ethics codes as do other 
professionals.  Professionals are expected to adhere to these codes.  If and when adopted 
by individual states, the provisions can be enforced against individual members who may 
                                                          
82 Ira C. Lupu, The Case against Legislative Codification of Religious Liberty ([New York, NY]: Cardozo 
Law Review, 1999).  Lupu is in some ways refreshing because he thinks RFRAs are merely inadvisable.  
He does not consider them unconstitutional.   For example, he thinks RFRAs cause atrophy in the first 
amendment jurisprudence of state and federal supreme courts, and that they are difficult if not impossible to 
craft in a form that will be functional.  
83 Ian Vanderwalker, "Abortion and Informed Consent: How Biased Counseling Laws Mandate Violations 
of Medical Ethics," Mich. J. Gender & L. 19(2012).  Vandewalker had been an attorney for the Center for 
Reproductive Rights.  
84 Andrea Lee, "Conscientious Objection and Pharmacists' Professional Obligation to Ensure Access to 
Legitimately Prescribed Medication," Women's Rts. L. Rep. 33(2011). 
85 Wurdock, "Doctors, Dioceses, and Decisions: Examining the Impact of the Catholic Hospital System and 
Federal Conscience Clauses on Medical Education." 
86 Jennifer B. Scheu, "A First Amendment Objection to the Affordable Care Act's Individual Mandate," 
Brooklyn Law Review 79, no. 2 (2014). 
87 E. Whelan, "The HHS Contraception Mandate Vs. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act," Notre Dame 
Law Review 87, no. 5 (2012). 
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be disciplined for infractions or who may even lose their professional credentials, thereby 
precluding their continued practice in that jurisdiction.  As seen in the section on federal 
legislation, statutes may sometimes set the standard for care.  For example, the PPACA 
provided that physicians could not be disciplined or discriminated against for refusing to 
participate in or refer for abortions.  Conscience clauses, however, may protect against 
much more than abortion, although that remains a significant issue.  And in the absence 
of a conscience clause in a code or statute, a RFRA may provide some basic protection, 
as seen in the next section.  First, however, because professional codes define expected 
standards of practice, and because violations can lead to loss of employment, we shall 
examine a few professional codes.  
     The American Pharmacist Association has a code of ethics.88   It has language about 
respecting “the autonomy and dignity” of every patient.  It does not, however, contain 
any precise language about whether the pharmacist may ethically withhold lawful 
medications from the patient, such as pregnancy –preventing drugs or emergency 
contraception or “Plan B” drugs which the pharmacist may consider immoral.   Nor does 
it have any requirement to refer a patient to another pharmacist when he or she has a 
moral objection to dispensing the drugs.    Similarly, the American Society of Health-
System Pharmacists has a preamble to this model code which seeks “to state publicly the 
principles that form the fundamental basis of the roles and responsibilities of 
pharmacists.”89  The Code was reviewed in 2012 and still found to be appropriate.   
                                                          
88 This 1994 model code was accessed on March 10, 2016 at http://www.pharmacist.com/code-ethics 




     This is a model code, however, and a pharmacist practicing in Kentucky, Georgia, or 
California must comply with the codes of those states, not necessarily of a model code.  
In Kentucky physicians, dentists, pharmacists, and others are governed by provisions 
contained in section 201 of the Kentucky Administrative Regulations.  Pharmacists are 
governed by chapter 2.90  No specific provision, however, either requires a pharmacist to 
dispense all lawfully prescribed medication, or permits the pharmacist to refuse to fill a 
prescription.  Nor is there any provision which requires the employer of the pharmacist to 
have a policy requiring the pharmacist to dispense or permitting the pharmacist not to 
dispense.   
     Other states, however, are much clearer and have adjusted the state’s code to provide 
that patients will receive all lawful medications to which they are entitled in a timely 
manner, and particularly for prescribed medications.  These states are referred to as “must 
fill” states.  Although some distinctions can be made from state to state, the intent is to 
require all pharmacists to fill all prescriptions.   One example is California.  California’s 
Business and Professional Code, section 733, covers pharmacists.  The intent of the 
provision is to ensure that “health care professionals dispense prescription drugs and 
devices in a timely way or provide appropriate referrals for patients to obtain the 
necessary prescription drugs and devices, despite the health care professional’s objection 
to dispensing the drugs or devices on ethical, moral, or religious grounds.”91  The law 
provides that 
No licentiate shall obstruct a patient in obtaining a prescription drug or device that has 
been legally prescribed or ordered for that patient. A violation of this section constitutes 
                                                          
90  201 KAR chapter 2 accessed on March 10, 2016 at   http://www.lrc.state.ky.us/kar/title201.htm 
91 The California law can be found at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-
bin/displaycode?section=bpc&group=00001-01000&file=725-733 and was accessed on March 10, 2016.  
 41 
 
unprofessional conduct by the licentiate and shall subject the licentiate to disciplinary or 
administrative action by his or her licensing agency. ..  a licentiate shall dispense drugs 
and devices… pursuant to a lawful order or prescription unless one of the following 
circumstances exists: 
(1)  Based solely on the licentiate’s professional training and judgment, dispensing 
pursuant to the order or the prescription is contrary to law… 
(2)  The prescription drug or device is not in stock… 
(3)  The licentiate refuses on ethical, moral, or religious grounds to dispense a drug or 
device pursuant to an order or prescription. A licentiate may decline to dispense a 
prescription drug or device on this basis only if the licentiate has previously notified his 
or her employer, in writing, of the drug or class of drugs to which he or she objects, and 
the licentiate’s employer can, without creating undue hardship, provide a reasonable 
accommodation of the licentiate’s objection. The licentiate’s employer shall establish 
protocols that ensure that the patient has timely access to the prescribed drug or device 
despite the licentiate’s refusal to dispense the prescription or order. For purposes of this 
section, “reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship” shall have the same 
meaning as applied to those terms. 
     The operating space for an objecting California pharmacist is quite limited.  
Nonetheless, if the pharmacist objects beforehand in writing, and if he or she is still hired, 
and if he or she is still employed, and if the employer has arranged beforehand for 
another pharmacist on hand who has no objections to filling the prescription, and if the 
employer can accommodate the licensee’s objection without undue hardship, then the 
licensee can continue to work there without disciplinary action by the California Board of 
Pharmacy.  Although there is a balancing test here, California in its public policy has 
heavily weighted the scale in favor of the patient who is not to be “obstructed” in 
obtaining lawful medications.  There is no balancing test regarding how inconvenienced 
or even burdened the patient is because of the time or travel involved in finding a more 
accommodating pharmacist.  For example, it does not matter if the patient has five 
pharmacies within a three minute walk or is located in a remote area of the Sierras.  Nor 
does it matter if the patient is seeking emergency contraception in a timely manner or 
 42 
 
wants a chemically induced abortion when several weeks pregnant.  The law does, 
however, have the benefits of clarity and simplicity.  
     Other states have gone in the other direction and have written either general or 
specific “conscience clauses” into their state codes.  Georgia is an example of a state 
which has given pharmacists great discretion and given timely patient access to all lawful 
drugs and devices little weight.  In its Board of Pharmacy regulations, Georgia 
Administrative Code Rule 480-5-.03, Georgia provides that  
The Board is authorized to take disciplinary action for unprofessional conduct. .. The 
Board establishes a Code of Professional Conduct which shall apply to and be observed 
by all persons engaged in the practice of pharmacy in the State of Georgia… 
(n)  Refusal to fill prescription.  It shall not be considered unprofessional conduct for any 
pharmacist to refuse to fill any prescription based on his/her professional judgment or 
ethical or moral beliefs… 
(p) Violations of the Code of Professional Conduct.  The above set out Code of 
Professional Conduct is expressly adopted by the Board and shall govern the conduct of 
all those admitted to practice pharmacy in their capacities as pharmacists.92  
The Code does not specifically address the issue of referrals.   
     As this is being written, Georgia is debating whether or not to adopt a more general 
RFRA.  As seen above, it already has a conscience clause in its pharmacy regulations, so 
it may feel less compelled, as a matter of medical practice, to enact a RFRA.  Other 
states, however, have adopted RFRAs.   
State RFRAs 
     States responded to the Boerne case as Congress had responded to the Smith decision, 
but neither as quickly nor as wholeheartedly nor as uniformly.  Indeed, only 22 states 
                                                          




have passed their own RFRAs restoring the “strict scrutiny” test for their own 
legislation.93  Lund summarizes their main features as providing that governments may 
substantially burden free exercise only if the burden furthers a compelling governmental 
interest, and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest.94  Lund 
also notes that some states have maintained their own constitutional protections for free 
exercise independent of any state legislation.  However, in many states and for much if 
not most of the population, there is neither a constitutional nor a statutory bar to 
burdening free exercise.   There is no balancing of interests regardless of how severe or 
limiting the legislation might be on free exercise.  
     RFRAs are broad.  They do not cover only the conscientious objection claims made by 
medical professionals, but also the objection of Amish in not sending their children to 
public school or affixing certain safety equipment to their buggies, to parents who object 
to the mandatory vaccination of their children, to the provision of or withholding of life-
sustaining nutrients or medications at the end of life, to the construction of a mosque 
minaret contrary to local building codes, to the prohibition on wearing religious attire or 
headgear when receiving state identification cards, and so on.  But it is in the RFRA 
context that medical conscientious objection issues are most commonly framed.  
     Connecticut passed the very first state RFRA in 1993.   Connecticut’s statute section 
52-571b provides in part that  
                                                          
93 See, e.g., Bertelsen, "Conscientious Objection of Health Care Providers: Lessons from the Experience of 
the United States."; D. Bridge, "Religious Freedom or Libertarianism: What Explains State Enactments of 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act Laws?," Journal of Church and State 56, no. 2 (2014); D. Claborn, 
"Effects of Judicial and Legislative Attempts to Increase Religious Freedom in U.S. State Courts," ibid.53, 
no. 4 (2011). 
94 Lund, "Religious Liberty after Gonzales: A Look at State Rfras." 476 
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Sec. 52-571b. Action or defense authorized when state or political subdivision 
burdens a person’s exercise of religion. (a) The state or any political subdivision of the 
state shall not burden a person’s exercise of religion under section 3 of article first of the 
Constitution of the state even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, 
except as provided in subsection (b) of this section. 
(b) The state or any political subdivision of the state may burden a person’s exercise of 
religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (1) is in 
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, and (2) is the least restrictive means 
of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 
(c) A person whose exercise of religion has been burdened in violation of the 
provisions of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial 





     This is very similar to the federal RFRA, and very similar to the Supreme Court’s pre-
Smith tests for constitutionality.  It includes the balancing test of placing a burden on the 
free exercise of one’s religion on the basis of a compelling governmental interest, and 
that interest must be implemented using the least restrictive means available. There is one 
huge difference, however.  The federal RFRA and most other RFRAs use the following 
balancing test:  In order to significantly burden the free exercise, the government’s 
interest must be compelling and use the least restrictive means.  The Connecticut statute 
is much more protective of free exercise, and much more demanding of the laws of 
general applicability of it and its localities.  Connecticut does not require a substantial 
burden, but a mere burden on free exercise.  Apparently, any burden will do.  
     Rhode Island was also remarkably quick out of the gate in passing its own RFRA.96  
Rhode Island Code 42-80.1 provides in part that  
                                                          
95 Connecticut Statutes 52-571b, accessed on March 10, 2016 at 
https://www.cga.ct.gov/current/pub/chap_925.htm#sec_52-571b  





   § 42-80.1-3 Religious freedom protected. – (a) Except as provided for in subsection 
(b), a governmental authority may not restrict a person's free exercise of religion. 
   (b) A governmental authority may restrict a person's free exercise of religion only if: 
   (1) The restriction is in the form of a rule of general applicability, and does not 
intentionally discriminate against religion, or among religions; and 
   (2) The governmental authority proves that application of the restriction to the person 
is essential to further a compelling governmental interest, and is the least restrictive 
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.  
     This statute is also worded slightly differently from the federal RFRA.  However, it 
does not refer to a “burden” or a “substantial burden” on one’s free exercise, but simply 
says no governmental authority shall “restrict a person’s free exercise of religion.”  It is 
stronger of free exercise interests because it provides that the restriction on the free 
exercise must be “essential” to further the compelling governmental interest.   Otherwise, 
it retains the pre-Smith and federal RFRA balancing tests.  
     Other, subsequent statutes tend not to be as strong for potential plaintiffs.  While they 
provide protection using a strict scrutiny standard, in order to meet the threshold 
requiring a balancing test the aggrieved party must typically demonstrate a “significant 
burden”  or a “substantial burden” rather than a mere “burden” on his or her free exercise.  
For example, the Indiana RFRA provides in part that:  
Sec. 8. (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), a governmental entity may not 
substantially burden a person's exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a 
rule of general applicability. (b) A governmental entity may substantially burden a 
person's exercise of religion only if the governmental entity demonstrates that application 
of the burden to the person: (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; 




                                                          
97  Text is from Indiana’s RFRA as provided by the Indianapolis Star,  
http://www.indystar.com/story/news/politics/2015/03/27/text-indianas-religious-freedom-law/70539772/  




     As of the writing of this thesis 22 states had enacted RFRAs.  Figure 2 records the 
states and when the RFRA was enacted.  
 
     Although there was some geographical dispersal early, RFRAs remain rare in the Mid-
Atlantic, in New England after an initial adoption in two states, in the upper Midwest, 
and in the West.  Most recently they have been enacted only in the South and lower 
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Midwest, except for Indiana.   Note that the first states to adopt tend to be more 
progressive than the other states, and no state that might be considered progressive has 
passed a RFRA in 20 years.   
Must Fill Laws 
       Figure 3 records those states with “must fill” requirements. 
 
     These states are fairly widely dispersed and most trend toward more progressive 
policies. The Massachusetts must fill policy – the first in the nation - was enacted not 
legislatively nor by an Executive Order, but by a bureaucracy.  Most of the others are 
clustered in 2009 and are likely a response to the Bush Administration’s enhancement of 
conscience protections for medical professionals via rulemaking, not legislation, in the 
waning days of 2008.  These states considered those rules imbalanced and insufficiently 
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protective of important health considerations, and attempted to rebalance by eliminating 
or limiting any conscience provision for pharmacists.   
     Note also that must fill requirements are much more specific than RFRAs.  RFRAs 
cover any free exercise claim, and are thus much broader than medical activities.  
Accordingly, there are different issues when analyzing RFRAs and must fill policies as a 
matter of or possible reflection of public opinion or sentiment.  Must fill policies are 
intended to affect specific consumers and specific providers.  RFRAs are intended to 
cover free exercise generally, regardless of whether the specific issue is religious attire in 
the workplace, a requirement to participate in an assisted suicide, or food restrictions in 
an institutional environment.  The analysis of general opinion and policy, and specific 
opinion and policy, is discussed more below.  
How Does Opinion Translate into Policy?  Literature Review of General and Specific 
Public Opinion and Its Relationships to Policy 
     It is generally thought that public opinion translates into public policy as measured by, 
e.g., legislation.  It may be fast or slow, efficient or inefficient, but states with liberal 
electorates tend to have liberal policies, and states with conservative electorates tend to 
have conservative policies.  If this is the case, then states with electorates more sensitive 
to medical conscientious objection should be more likely to have their policies reflect this 
opinion in, e.g., RFRAs or conscience clauses, than states with less sensitive electorates.  
Conversely, those states with electorates more focused on the delivery of lawful or even 
fundamentally guaranteed medical care and services to patients will be less likely to 
adopt policies supporting medical conscientious objection.  This general idea on the 
responsiveness of government to electorates is confirmed in several studies which, 
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nonetheless, also add some significant qualifications to the simple conclusion.  Also, for 
the first time political scientists enter the lists of scholarly debate.   
     Brace notes the utility of using General Social Survey data to track the responsiveness 
of policy (the dependent variable) to opinion (some of the independent variables) at the 
national level, but uses the data across nine policy areas at the state level when measuring 
specific attitudes rather than e.g., a general “ideology” measure.  He “disaggregates” the 
General Social Survey data to the state level, and concludes that, with one exception 
(death penalty) there is a strong relationship between specific state opinion and specific 
state policies.98 Norrander does a study regarding death penalty sentencing (the 
dependent variable in the states), examining four standard models used to explain the link 
between opinion and policy.   Using American National Election Study data and a 1936 
Gallup poll, she confirms the link and concludes that each model has explanatory power 
but that a combination (her “historical causal chain”) is the most rigorous.99   
     Lax and Lupia both analyze the basic premise of policy responsiveness with respect to 
gay rights.  Lax measures eight specific gay rights issues using a simulation of state 
opinion.  He concludes that policy is responsive to specific opinion measurements, (i.e., 
they move in the same direction) but is not necessarily congruent, (i.e. they do not move 
to the same degree).  His model is complex and has several key factors besides opinion, 
such as saliency, elite opinion, government institutions, and interest groups.100  Lupia did 
                                                          
98 Paul Brace et al., "Public Opinion in the American States: New Perspectives Using National Survey 
Data," American Journal of Political Science 46, no. 1 (2002). 
99 Barbara Norrander, "The Multi-Layered Impact of Public Opinion on Capital Punishment 
Implementation in the American States," Political Research Quarterly 53, no. 4 (2000). 
100 Jeffrey R. Lax and Justin H. Phillips, "Gay Rights in the States: Public Opinion and Policy 
Responsiveness," The American Political Science Review 103, no. 3 (2009).  One major blunder may be a 
finding he adopted on 383 that seeking gay rights in the courts is not likely to be successful.  
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a similar study on state constitutional treatment of same-sex marriage.  Examining those 
states with constitutional bars (the dependent variable), he finds a significant factor is 
whether states can directly translate opinion into policy via voter referenda.  He uses state 
polling data for his analysis.  Opinion is a necessary but insufficient cause absent this 
constitutional amendment apparatus.101    
     In a more recent study using a similar methodology Lax studied state opinion across 
eight policy spheres and confirmed that policy was highly responsive to specific policy 
opinion but that it was congruent with a majoritarianism only half the time, a 
phenomenon he calls “the democratic deficit”.  This time his state opinion came from 
advocacy groups and more local research organizations.102    
     Some medical professionals may perceive themselves to be under professional attack 
by an increasingly intolerant government or medical establishment.  More generally, do 
U.S. citizens consider themselves to have lost liberty?  Gibson concludes that this is the 
case, and that Americans perceive themselves to be less free and more subject to 
intolerance – a “dispersed intolerance” - than during the McCarthy era, when intolerance 
was more narrowly focused on the Left.  He considers three polls from 1954, 1987, and 
2005 to reach these conclusion using simple tables to record his results.103 While Gibson 
studies perceived intolerance, Davidson has studied actual intolerance when pharmacists 
place their state licenses and jobs in jeopardy by not conforming to Nevada’s “must fill” 
law for dispensing five drugs.  Her N=668 study, with interesting demographic factors of 
                                                          
101 Arthur Lupia, et al, "Why State Constitutions Differ in Their Treatment of Same-Sex Marriage," The 
Journal of Politics 72, no. 4 (2010). 
102 Jeffrey R. Lax and Justin H. Phillips, "The Democratic Deficit in the States," American Journal of 
Political Science 56, no. 1 (2012). 




sex, religion, and age, demonstrates how many pharmacists disobey the laws.104 Her 
study involved mailing a questionnaire to every pharmacist in the state, with the option of 
returning written responses or completing the survey via Survey Monkey.  
     Olson retests and reconfirms the “religion gap” phenomenon in which more religious 
voters (the independent variables), as measured by belief, behavior, and belonging, tend 
to vote more conservatively (the dependent variable), although differences within 
religious communities might be more significant than differences between religious 
communities.  Her study used ANES data and recorded it in simple tables, was a national 
study only, and had appropriate qualifications on what factors might be more 
fundamental than some of these measures of “religiosity”.105   If “conscience clauses” are 
a conservative issue, then these clauses should fare better in a more conservative state if 
and when that particular opinion can translate into governmental policy.  Putnam makes 
the same point, but examines data over a much longer period of time, and has a more 
nuanced conclusion regarding the “God Gap”.   Nonetheless, he too finds such a gap 
exists, and has accelerated from the 1950s when it hardly seemed to exist.106 
     In a more extensive study Olson examined the links between “belonging” (religious 
affiliation), “behaving” (religious commitment operationalized as church attendance), and 
“belief” (as measured by reverence for authoritative holy books) and found that there was 
a strong relationship between “belief” and Presidential approval ratings, but “belonging” 
                                                          
104 Laura A. Davidson et al., "Religion and Conscientious Objection: A Survey of Pharmacists’ Willingness 
to Dispense Medications," Social Science & Medicine 71, no. 1 (2010). 
105 Laura R. Olson and John C. Green, "The Religion Gap," PS: Political Science & Politics 39, no. 3 
(2006). 
106 Putnam, Campbell, and Garrett, American Grace : How Religion Divides and Unites Us.  Chapter 11, 
Religion in American Politics, is particularly useful.  
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was not a significant contributor to those ratings.107  In a topically related study, Driskell 
found that mere attendance at religious services was too crude a measure for “religiosity.”  
Other measures, and particularly “belief” (and especially “generalized macro religious 
belief”) are more accurate predictors of participation in politics.108   
     Djupe reminds us that in policy responsiveness studies, how an issue is framed is 
significant.  Should proponents of a policy argue from a moral or religious base, or 
should they appeal to their “rights”?  Using an experimental design, Djupe demonstrates 
that an appeal to “rights” does not stop discourse, but is seen as more accessible and less 
polarizing than an appeal to morality.109  If so, that could have important implications for 
how proponents of conscience clauses or state RFRAs frame the issue.  
Translating Opinion Into RFRAs and “Must Fill” Requirements 
     The Federal RFRA and most of the mini-state RFRAs passed quickly and with great 
support from politicians and the public.  See Figure 2.  But other states failed to pass 
RFRAs, or even passed “anti-RFRA laws” such as Nevada’s “must fill” law in which, 
regardless of the violation of one’s conscience, a pharmacist, doctor, or nurse is required 
to perform certain acts or prescribe certain drugs.  What accounts for the differences?  
What factors or conditions lead to the adoption or the rejection of state RFRAs?  And 
how responsive are the states?   
Figure 4   States with RFRAs or Some Judicial or Constitutional Protection 
                                                          
107 Laura Olson and Adam Warber, "Belonging, Behaving, and Believing," Political Research Quarterly 
61, no. 2 (2008). 
108 Robyn Driskell, Elizabeth Embry, and Larry Lyon, "Faith and Politics: The Influence of Religious 
Beliefs on Political Participation<Sup>*</Sup>," Social Science Quarterly 89, no. 2 (2008). 
109 Paul A. Djupe et al., "Rights Talk: The Opinion Dynamics of Rights Framing," Social Science Quarterly 




(This Figure is helpful but is now somewhat dated.  Utah, Arkansas, Mississippi, and 
Indiana have added RFRAs since it was produced.  As of the date of writing this thesis, 
Georgia is debating the issue.)  
      Only one political science study has attempted to explain why states adopt RFRAs.   
Bridge asked whether states pass RFRA legislation (the dependent variable) because of 
state opinion regarding religious freedom, or because of religious freedom?111  That is, is 
it the libertarian, liberty interest which succeeds in RFRA legislation, or because of the 
                                                          
110 Accessed on February 25, 2016 from the Washington Post at 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/03/01/where-in-the-u-s-are-there-heightened-
protections-for-religious-freedom/    Georgia’s governor is currently considering what to do with a bill 
passed in both houses of its legislature.  This chart distinguishes between those states with legislative 
RFRAs, and those states which have at least some constitutional protection of the state’s first amendment 
or of conscience, similar to federal Supreme Court jurisprudence prior to the 1990 Smith case.  
111 Bridge, "Religious Freedom or Libertarianism: What Explains State Enactments of Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act Laws?." 
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religious interest?  He relies on data from Ruger112 and Pew (Religious Landscape Survey 
of 2007) to measure partisanship, libertarian scores for the state, and religion as measured 
by “belonging, believing, and behaving” criteria to conclude that it is the religious 
impulse of a state, not its generic love of liberty, that leads to RFRA protection.  His 
conclusion is consistent with Lax, Brace, and Lupia’s conclusion that specific opinion 
and not general ideology or opinion has the greater relationship to policy, and this 
approach explained fifteen of the sixteen states that had RFRAs.  As a matter of 
methodology, however, I note that other scholars are reluctant to use national survey data 
for state opinion because the data is intended to duplicate national opinion rather than 
state opinion.  Bridge used national data nonetheless, contending that the Pew research 
data was sufficiently large (N = 35,556) so that each state had a large enough sample.   
     Although only one study has specifically examined how and why states adopts 
RFRAs, other models might help to explain how and why one state’s RFRA adoption or 
rejection is influenced by the federal RFRA or by other state RFRAs.   How do states 
learn from or influence one another?   A glance at Figure 1 demonstrates that state 
RFRAs have tended to prevail more in the South and Midwest.  Is that geographical 
clustering largely coincidental, or is it suggestive?  What, if anything, have these states 
learned from their perceptions of their own and other states?113  In their research of policy 
diffusion and the death penalty, Mooney and Lee found that “morality policy” – policy 
which involves fundamental questions of first principles – may be “learned” less from 
other states, but may be more sensitive to public opinion, than other policies.  In these 
                                                          
112 William Ruger and Jason Sorens, Freedom in the 50 States : An Index of Personal and Economic 
Freedom, 2013 edition. ed. (Arlington, Virginia :: Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 2013). 
113 C. R. Shipan and C. Volden, "Policy Diffusion: Seven Lessons for Scholars and Practitioners," Public 
Administration Review 72, no. 6 (2012). 
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cases, “democracy supersedes learning.”114  Conscience clauses, of course, are by their 
nature about “morality policy”.   
     Distinct but related to the issue of how opinion is translated into the enactment of 
policy is the issue of policy effectiveness.  Have state RFRAs accomplished their 
intended purpose of protecting free exercise?   There are serious questions about whether 
they do so.   
     Both Claborn115 and Lund116 examine legal cases after the federal and state RFRAs 
passed and conclude that this legislation did not in the main have the intended effect of 
protecting conscience at the state level.  Claborn’s study, based on his dissertation, is 
more crude and does not take into account that most cases are settled, not litigated.  
Accordingly, merely measuring litigation is not necessarily an accurate way of 
determining the effectiveness of legislation.  Less litigation, and fewer trial victories, 
does not mean less protection.  Lund notes this, as does Laycock.  Nonetheless, Lund also 
concludes that state RFRAs, in particular, have largely failed if their purpose was to 
protect religious conduct.117  He cites cases from several states to show state judges are, 
in many cases, following the post-Smith Supreme Court rather than their own state RFRA 
law.  
                                                          
114 Christopher Z. Mooney and Mei-Hsien Lee, "The Temporal Diffusion of Morality Policy: The Case of 
Death Penalty Legislation in the American States," Policy Studies Journal 27, no. 4 (1999). 
115 Claborn, "Effects of Judicial and Legislative Attempts to Increase Religious Freedom in U.S. State 
Courts." 
116 Lund, "Religious Liberty after Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs."  Laycock also thinks state RFRAs 
have promised more than they have delivered.  Laycock Douglas, "The Campaign against Religious 
Liberty," in The Rise of Corporate Religious Liberty(Oxford University Press, 2016). 
117See also the state emphasis in  Elizabeth Shaw, Religious Liberty : Proceedings from the 35th Annual 
Convention of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars, September 28-30, 2012, Washington, D.C, Fellowship 
of Catholic Scholars Convention  ([Notre Dame, IN]: Fellowship of Catholic Scholars, 2014).  See also 
William Saunders’s chapter on Protecting Conscience at the State Level.   
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     Notwithstanding Lund and Claborn’s specific studies, in a cross national study Finke 
concludes that an independent judiciary is one of the key ingredients to religious liberty 
and is a greater predictor of religious freedom than are other measures.118   Richardson’s 
conclusion regarding the “judicialization of politics” in general and of religion in 
particular, by which he means major political decisions are rendered by the courts rather 
than the executive or legislature, is consistent with both.119  Courts can override 
legislation.  This conclusion can also be consistent with Fisher in that a court may restrain 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  DATA, RESULTS, AND ANALYSIS 
Gaps and Methodology 
     There is a tremendous amount of work on the constitutional and legal background to 
free exercise and conscience exemptions.  There is also a large literature on medical 
ethics and the legal justification for or rejection of RFRAs and conscience clauses for 
medical practitioners.  However, very little has been done by political scientists.  What 
political scientists have contributed is study of whether, how, and to what degree some 
policy spheres – gay rights, environmental protection, capital punishment, welfare 
reform, etc. – have been affected by and been responsive to both general (ideological) 
opinion and more specific public opinion in those jurisdictions.  They have contributed to 
an understanding of how opinion translates into policy.  Tracing the public opinion 
support for or opposition to RFRAs or conscience clauses is, however, with the exception 
of Bridge, largely unchartered territory.  Thus, we do not know which factors are 
necessary or sufficient or influential or even merely correlated or relational to conscience 
protecting legislation.        
     My hypotheses are that, generally, the opinion and perspective of religiously oriented 
people will be reflected in public policy protecting or recognizing religious perspectives, 
such as free exercise.  Conversely, the more secularly minded the populace, the less 
public policy will protect free exercise, and the more policy outcomes will protect or 
recognize other interests.  More specifically, the more “religious” the jurisdiction’s 
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citizens, the more likely a RFRA will be enacted.  The more “secular” the jurisdiction’s 
citizens, the less likely a RFRA will be enacted and the more likely there will be policy 
outcomes reflecting other interests, such as must fill requirements.   Accordingly, a 
state’s policy will bear a relationship to and be responsive to its religious complexion.  
The hypotheses are set out more formally in Chapter One under the Section “Methods, 
Data, and Theories.”  
     I have two dependent variables.  The first is the enactment at the state level of a 
RFRA.  The second is the enactment at the state level of a “must fill” pharmacy 
requirement.  All 50 states are analyzed.120  These are coded as dichotomous 
measurements.  
     To study relationships with the two dependent variables I have eleven independent 
variables.  Seven are “religious” variables of a given state.  Following the “believing, 
belonging, behaving” approach, I have three variables for “belonging” – whether the 
respondent self-identified as evangelical, Roman Catholic, or “unaffiliated” with any 
religion.  I use one variable for “behaving” – whether the respondent prays daily.  I use 
three variables for “believing” – whether religion is “very important” in the respondent’s 
life, whether the respondent considers the Bible to be the word of God, and whether the 
respondent considers religion to be the most important source for guidance in 
determining what is right or wrong.  This data is recorded as a percentage of the 
population.  
                                                          
120 The state data from the Pew 2014 study was released on February 29, 2016.  This is the source of my 
state data.  
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     Finally, four other control variables are used to measure other plausible contributors to 
the enactment of or failure to enact a RFRA and of a “must fill” pharmacy law.  Two 
measure the relationships between interest group expenditures in a given jurisdiction and 
the existence of a RFRA or “must fill” requirement.  I selected Planned Parenthood 
affiliate expenditures per state.  I also selected National Right to Life affiliates and other 
pro-life groups’ (i.e., IRS “R62” groups) expenditures per state.  In each case I utilized 
data extracted from the group’s IRS Form 990 and recorded at Guidestar.org.   I simply 
added the expenditures (not counting any groups that spent less than $100,000) and 
divided by the number of state residents using 2014 estimated census information, giving 
expenditure per resident.  I did not include national headquarters expenditures.    
     These independent variables are summarized in Figure 5, below. 
Figure 5 Table of Independent Variables 
                                                                                                          Measurement 
Independent Variable 
1.  Religiosity – Belonging (Identification as Evangelical)              % of adult population      
2.  Religiosity – Belonging (Identification as Roman Catholic)       % of adult population 
3.  Religiosity – Belonging (Identification as Unaffiliated)              % of adult population 
4.  Religiosity – Behaving (Prayer)                                                   % of adults who pray  
                                                                                                           daily 
5.  Religiosity – Believing (Religion is the Most Important             % of adult population 
     Source of Guidance for Right and Wrong) 
6.  Religiosity – Believing (Religion is Important in My Life)        % of adult population 
7.  Religiosity – Believing (Bible is the Word of God)                    % of adult population 
8.  Interest Group Expenditure (Planned Parenthood)                      Dollars per resident 
9.  Interest Group Expenditure (Right to Life)                                 Dollars per resident 
10.  Governor at RFRA Enactment                                                   0 is Democrat, 1 is  
                                                                                                           Republican 
11.  Governor at Must Fill Enactment                                               0 is Democrat, 1 is 
                                                                                                           Republican 
 
     This methodology may underestimate expenditures of opponents of RFRAs because I 
focus only on one group – Planned Parenthood affiliates.  Many other allied groups also 
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oppose RFRAs and support must fill requirements.  On the other hand, this methodology 
may overestimate expenditures of “Right to Life” groups because I have added groups 
with that title in their name in addition to any group listed under the “R62” code, which 
has, as a major purpose, prolife activities.  Of course, expenditures of these groups are 
not limited to advocacy or lobbying or educational purposes.  Much of their expenditures 
are in the areas of customer or patient care.  I included these, nonetheless, because  they 
would tend to generate a customer base or patient goodwill toward the organization that 
is providing such care.   
     The last control variables I used were partisan measures - the party of the governor 
when the RFRA or “must fill” requirement was passed.  These results are coded as 
Democrat is 0, and 1 is Republican.  
     After an overview of national level data and trends using American National Election 
Study (ANES) and Pew data to show national trends of religious opinion over 60 years, I 
used Pew data for each state from its 2014 Religious Landscape Survey.  The ANES data 
was obtained from the University of California, Berkeley, SDA website.   In analyzing 
national trends I also used the “believing, belonging, behaving” approach and tried to use 
questions that were identical to or very similar to those used in the Pew Study.  
Accordingly, I have three “belonging”, one “behaving”, and three “believing” responses.    
In the “National Trend” section below, I also use some Pew data showing how its 
national responses to these questions changed from its 2007 study to its 2014 study.   
     Finally, note the timing for data on the independent variables.  For the state data on 
religious variables, I rely primarily on PEW data from its 2014 Religious Landscape 
Survey, even though the state may have considered its RFRA or must fill requirement 
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some years earlier.  For the state data on interest group expenditures, I rely on data 
submitted to the IRS for the 2014 tax year, reported in 2015, regardless of the year in 
which the RFRA or must fill requirement was considered.  For the state data on the party 
affiliation of the governor, I use the year in which the RFRA or must fill requirement was 
enacted.  
National Trends 
     Figure 6 reflects the “belonging” criterion over 20 years.  Respondents were grouped 
by self-identification.   Although there may be some uncertainty over how precisely one 
measures religious self-identification, what is both clear and significant is that both the 
Evangelical and Roman Catholic group are decreasing in numbers, while the Unaffiliated 
Group is substantially increasing in numbers.  Note, however, that the Unaffiliated are 
not necessarily nonreligious.   This group includes both those who consider themselves 
nonreligious and those who consider themselves not to be part of any religious group or 
tradition.   Each figure measures according to the percentage of the national population.   
     Figure 6   National religious trends “Belonging” obtained from ANES data via the 




















     Figure 7 illustrates the national trend regarding four independent variables – the 
“belief” and “behaving” variables.   These variables were available for study for a longer 
period of time in the ANES data, and thus I start with a cumulative 1952-1992 period.   
Of the four variables measuring religiosity, two have slowly but clearly declined over 
time.   The percentages of respondents who state that “The Bible is the Word of God” and 
“Religion is Important in My Life” are decreasing.   The percentage of those who state 
that “My Religion Provides Guidance for My Life” and who “Pray Daily” have been 
holding fairly steady for decades.  What is significant from Figure 6 is that not a single 
measure of religious practice has increased over this time period.  Also, there are fairly 
precipitate and unprecedented declines from 2008-2012 in every category.  It will be 
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interesting to see when the 2016 ANES data are released whether this four year drop 
represents an anomaly or may be the beginning of a sea change in the American public.121  
Figure 7  National religious trends “Believing and Behaving” obtained from ANES data 
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     Figure 8 records the results from Pew’s National Religious Landscape Study of 2014.  
It charts national trends of the “belonging” criterion from its first Study in 2007.   Unlike 
the ANES data, Pew’s Study identifies religious group identification by asking the 
respondent to state which religious group he or she belongs to, and then categorizing that 
group (if any is identified) as “mainline Protestant”, “Jewish”, “evangelical”, “Roman 
Catholic”, and so on.   Thus, its methodology is different from the ANES Studies, and 
                                                          
121
 Catharine Cookson, Regulating Religion : The Courts and the Free Exercise Clause (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001).  Cookson posits a typology of four Western and American approaches to 
conscience protection or suppression.  Her approach is complementary to but distinct from a more common 
analysis of “aggressive secularism” in, e.g., France, or “passive secularism” or even “accommodationist” 
in, e.g., the United States.  The Oxford Handbook’s chapter on “Religion and Voting Behavior” makes a 
similar point, while observing on p. 482 that for most of the world – 55% - these categories may make little 
sense because “religion is more important than politics.”   Russell J. Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 
Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior, (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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will likely result in different findings.  My intent is not to compare the ANES categories 
with the Pew categories, but simply to note broad trends within each study.    
     Figures 8 and 9 use the same seven religious independent variables for national trends 
that I use later in the thesis to analyze state religious complexion and policy outcomes.   
     Figure 8 notes the slight but perceptible decrease in the number of Evangelicals, the 
more significant decrease in the number of Roman Catholics, and the very significant 
increase in those Americans who are Unaffiliated.   
































     Figure 9 illustrates trends in the four “believing and behaving” independent variables.  
Unlike the “belonging” variable immediately above, these variables show only a very 
slight change, with one exception.  The exception is that those Americans who believe 
that “Religion is the Most Important Source of Guidance in Determining Right and 
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Wrong” increased from 2007-2014.   Like the “belonging” variable above, the other three 
variables all show decreases.   
Figure 9   National religious trends “Believing and Behaving” 2007-2014 from Pew 
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     Both the ANES and the Pew data indicate that, with one exception, every nationally 
measured religious variable examined here has decreased over time.  Some are significant 
decreases, while others are only slight.  One – the “Religion as a Source of Guidance” 
variable - has increased in the last several years, according to the Pew data.  Yet it only 
counts for one third of Americans.  The most noteworthy finding is the very significant 
rise in the percentage of Americans who consider themselves to be Unaffiliated – those 
either having no religion at all, or who are not part of any formal or recognized religious 
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group.  This group is either the largest or second largest of any single category of 
respondents in the United States.122  
State Results 
     The two dependent variables in this study are the presence or absence of a state 
RFRA, and the presence of absence of a state “must fill” requirement for pharmacists.  
States can fit into six broad categories:  Those with a RFRA; those without a RFRA; 
those with judicially created and recognized freedom of exercise protection, probably 
based on a state constitutional provision (such as the U.S. had before Smith); those states 
that fit within none of these categories; those with “must fill” requirements; and those 
states that fit into more than one of these categories.   
     Figure 10 summarizes these categories.  Currently there are 22 states with RFRA 
legislation.   Of these, one, Illinois, has a specific exception with a ‘must fill” 
requirement, although its enforcement has been enjoined. There are nine states with 
RFRA-like judicial protection of varying degrees.  Of these, three have statutory 
exceptions with “must fill” requirements.  A total of eight states have “must fill” 
requirements.  Fifteen states have no particular statute or legally recognized protection or 






                                                          
122 And of course, those trends have consequences.   The Pew Research Center has some excellent 
interactive tools by which to gauge the political beliefs and behavior of these various groups.  
Unfortunately, none of the questions used was specific enough to cover RFRAs or “must fill” requirements.  
Nonetheless, it is clear that the Unaffiliated group identifies much more strongly with generally progressive 




Figure 10   Status of state law regarding RFRAs, at least some semblance of judicially 
protected free exercise, and “must fill” requirements as of February 29, 2016.  Compiled 
from various web sources including Professor Hamilton’s webpage, the National 






     How does the religious composition of a state translate into the policy outcomes of 
having a RFRA or a “must fill” requirement?  This subsection addresses that question 
using Pew data available for each state.   
     The methodology of this section is to examine several independent variables and their 
relationship to two dependent variables.  First, however,  Figure 11 below indicates a 
very broad analysis of the issue.   It is very crude, but very suggestive.  Pew uses several 
criteria to measure religiosity.  I will use several of those variables.  But Pew also does a 
composite rating measuring “overall religiosity” and measures states from “most 
religious” – Alabama and Mississippi  (both of which have RFRAs) – to “least religious” 
– Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts (none of which have RFRAs and 
two of which have “must fill” requirements).   I entered the scores for all RFRA states, all 
non-RFRA states, all non-Must Fill states, and all Must Fill states, and determined their 







                                                          
123 For the overall list of states, and for the methodology and definitions used by Pew in arriving at this 
measure, see its “overall combined index of state religiosity” under the “How Religious Is Your State” 





Figure 11  Highly Religious Populations, RFRAs, and Must Fill Requirements 
 
                    RFRA states   Non-RFRA States   Non-Must Fill States   Must Fill States    
Median               60.5 %               49%                          54%                         47% 
 
     This introductory Figure is notable for the stark contrast between the religious nature 
of the populations in “must fill” and RFRA states.  It suggests that the more religious a 
population, the more likely that state will have a RFRA.  Conversely, the less religious or 
more secular a state, the more likely it will have a “must fill” requirement.  
     Here is the information arranged by each state.  Every state which reaches the 60% 
mark has a RFRA with the exceptions of Georgia and West Virginia.  No state at or 
below the 50% mark has a RFRA with the exception of Connecticut and Rhode Island, 
which were the first states to pass RFRAs nearly 25 years ago.  
     Figure 11 illustrated the states categorized into groups.  Figures 12 and 13 record data 














Figure 13  States Montana to Wyoming 
 
     According to this rough composite measure “must fill” states tend to rank at the low 
end of the religiosity scale. States with RFRAs tend to rank at the high end of the 
religiosity scale.  There is certainly a relationship.  But “highly religious” is very broad.  I 
will break this overall rating into groups of independent variable components to test the 
relationship in a more rigorous manner and to see what it is about “highly religious 
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states” that might make enactment of a RFRA more likely and a must fill requirement 
less likely.   
     Figures 14 and 15 below record in bar chart form the first religious independent 
variable – “belonging” - by state.  This measures the religious identity of the respondent 
from those groups I posit as possibly significant for purposes of RFRA and must fill 
analysis.  I did not examine “mainline Protestant” as a separate category in this analysis.  
I examined some characteristics of this group in the Pew study and concluded that, while 
it is a more coherent analytical group than the Unaffiliated, it is less interesting for some 
social and political purposes.  As a class it does not appear to demonstrate the 
distinctiveness I was seeking in my selection of independent variables.  Other possible 
classes may be distinctive, but are rather small.   The mean and median of the RFRA 






















Figure 15  “Belonging” States from Montana to Wyoming 
 
     Again, the general trend is quite clear, and two of the three trends were predicted.  
Looking at the median scores, RFRA scores for evangelicals are significantly higher than 
for all states, and their score for all states is higher than for must fill states.  States with 
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higher percentages of evangelicals are more likely to have RFRAs.  Conversely, the 
scores for the Unaffiliated move in the opposite direction from evangelicals.  States with 
a higher percentage of Unaffiliated respondents are more likely to have must fill 
requirements and less likely to have RFRAs.  These two trends were predictable.  What I 
did not foresee was that Roman Catholics have the same relationship as the Unaffiliated.  
I would have thought they would bear a similar relationship to evangelicals.  In part this 
might be explained by the relative scarcity of Roman Catholics in the South, where 
evangelicals are rather well represented, and almost all states have RFRAs.     
     There are at least three glaring outliers.  Two states – Connecticut and Rhode Island – 
do not match the general evangelical pattern, yet have RFRAs.  One state – West Virginia 
– seems to meet the tentative religious “prerequisites” for membership in the RFRA club, 
with a very high percentage of evangelicals, yet it does not have one.  Other explanations 
must be sought.  In West Virginia, these might be the less professional nature of the 
legislature, which might render policy outcomes less responsive to general opinion.  Yet 
this possibility seems weaker when all the states have had 25 years to repudiate or 
correct, if they wished, the Smith decision.   In the New England states, these other 
factors might include the states’ history of religious accommodation or persecution, or 
even a simple reaction against a perceived unjust and unpopular Supreme Court case.  
Clearly, however, although these religious markers may be significant factors and are 
related to the dependent variables, they are not necessary although they may be sufficient 
for a RFRA.124 
                                                          
124 For purposes of discussion I did not include Georgia, which according to these criteria would seem to fit 
within the RFRA camp and yet does not have one.  Georgia is currently debating its RFRA and the 
outcome was not determined as of the time of writing.  
 76 
 
     The “must fill” states are different, and that is not surprising in a very small class.  
Nonetheless, the common pattern remains consistent.  Yet there are states with high 
percentages of Unaffiliated respondents which do not have must fill requirements, and 
states with must fill laws that do not have exceptionally high numbers of Unaffiliated 
respondents.   Therefore, other factors besides these religious criteria must be present.   
     Figures 16 and 17 note in bar chart form the second set of religious independent 
variables – “believing and behaving” - by state.  These measure the degree of daily 
prayer, one’s view of the Bible as the Word of God, whether religion is important in 
one’s life, and whether religion provides the most important source of guidance for 
determining right and wrong.   The mean and median of the respondents in the RFRA 

























Figure 16 State Religious Opinion “Believing and Behaving” from Pew Religious 











Figure 17  State Religious Opinion “Believing and Behaving” from Pew Religious 










     Measured by median, every religious variable is stronger in RFRA states than in all 
states.  Every variable is stronger in the all states category than in the must fill category.  
The relationship is consistent, positive, and appears rather strong.  Without knowing 
which states are RFRA states one can make a fairly confident prediction based on the 
charted responses alone. 
     But that prediction would not always be correct.  As noted above, there are states and 
outcomes which do not fit the expected pattern.   One might expect West Virginia, again, 
to have a RFRA.  But with these criteria West Virginia only exceeds the RFRA median in 
two of the four categories.  Perhaps those two are the more important.  Or perhaps there 
are other factors at play.  And, although some “religious” states do not have RFRAs, 
some states high in Unaffiliated respondents do not have must fill laws.  And some states 
with must fill laws do not have high numbers of Unaffiliated respondents.  Clearly, the 
match of very general opinion (religious judgments) with general policy (RFRA), and the 
match of very general opinion with specific policy (must fill) is not exact.  Therefore, 
there must be other explanations at play that are not captured by these religious factors.   
     Figure 18 is a summary of all the states and the religion variables categorized by 
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     Figure 18 illustrates that every single religious independent variable decreases from 
“RFRA states” to “all states” and from “all states” to “must fill” states.   There is one 
exception, however, and that is self-identified Roman Catholics.  The percentage of 
Roman Catholics in a state actually increases in the “must fill” states.    On the other 
hand, the percentage of Unaffiliated respondents increases from about 20% in RFRA 
states to 22% in all states to 28% in must fill states.   
     To summarize, the “belonging” variable, measured by self-identification with a 
particular religious tradition, appears to be a fairly accurate measure of the relationship  
between the size (relative or absolute) of a religious constituency and the outcome of a 
RFRA or must fill law.  Roman Catholics also fit this pattern but the relationship is 
opposite to what I expected.  Unaffiliated respondents also fit this pattern and move in an 
opposite direction from evangelicals.  The pattern is less clear with must fill states.  I 
suspect that is because the class is so small.  While evangelicals are the largest religious 
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group by a wide margin in RFRA states, and are the largest group in all states by a 
modest margin, Unaffiliated respondents are the largest group in the must fill states, 
barely beating out Roman Catholics, with evangelicals finishing a distant third.   
     The “behaving” variable, measured by the frequency the respondent engaged in 
prayer, also appears to be a fairly accurate measure of the relationship between the size of 
a religious constituency and the outcome of a RFRA or must fill law.  The higher the 
percentage of prayers, the more likely that state is to have a RFRA law and the less likely 
it is to have a must fill law.  
     The three “believing” variables, measured by one’s interpretation of the Bible, 
whether religion is important, and whether religion was the most important source for 
determining right from wrong, sustained the common pattern.  The more respondents 
believed these things, the more likely it was that state would have a RFRA.  Must fill 
states had lower percentages for all three variables.     
     I find these religious criteria very revealing.  Clearly, however, other factors are at 
work which are not captured by these independent variables and which cause outcomes 
contrary to expectations.  As noted above, West Virginia is not a RFRA state, but very 
little in these particular variables might explain why it is not.  New England states 
measure very low on most religious criteria, but not all are must fill states, and two even 
have RFRAs.  Little in these variables explains that.   
       Figure 19 reflects the last set of independent variables recorded in a chart.  These are 
interest group expenditures of Planned Parenthood and Right to Life organizations within 
states.  Special interest group expenditures may reflect the amount of work done in a 
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jurisdiction, the number of employees or clients affected, the amount of political 
influence an organization has, or the amount of good will an organization has generated.  
The mean and median of the RFRA states, all states, and the must fill states are recorded.   



























     Note the positive relationships.  Planned Parenthood and Right to Life expenditures 
move in opposite and predictable directions, with Planned Parenthood spending more 
funds in the eight must fill states than in all states, and more in all states than in the 22 
RFRA states.  Right to Life expenditures move exactly in the opposite direction.    Also 
note the relatively wide discrepancy between mean and median because of the small class 
sizes.  Finally, I should note that for both groups, expenditures in a number of states was 
$0. 
     The last independent variable to be examined is the party of the governor when the 
RFRA or must fill requirement was enacted.  The party of the governor may be an 
important measure of how partisan an issue is, or how closely parties are identified with 
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one side of an issue, or how effectively one party or the other implements the policy 
objectives of its constituents.  The basic story line bears this out. Nonetheless, this 
analysis probably requires the greatest caution because the numbers are so low, and 
because there are so many other possible factors at play.  There does appear to be at least 
a rough symmetry, however.  
     In the 22 RFRA states, 15 or 68% were passed with Republican governors.  (I include 
Governor Lowell Weicker of Connecticut as a “Republican.”  He was a Republican as 
Senator and an Independent as Governor.)  This percentage would be even higher when 
one considers that in Kentucky the RFRA was passed over a Democratic governor’s veto, 
but it nonetheless is counted in the “Democratic” column.   In the eight must fill states, 
the requirement occurred while the sitting governor was a Democrat five times, or 63% 
of the time.  Similarly, the number is somewhat skewed when one considers that in 
Massachusetts the must fill requirement was enacted by a state board independent of 
legislature or gubernatorial action, but it is nonetheless counted in the “Republican” 
column.125   
     Accordingly, RFRAs appear to be more likely to be passed in states with Republican 
governors, and must fill requirements are more likely to be passed or imposed in states 
with Democratic governors.   
     The Figures above indicate relationships between the independent variables and the 
outcomes of a RFRA or must fill law.  The only surprise so far is that it seems that the 
                                                          
125 These numbers and percentages were derived from an examination of the dates of passage of the RFRA 
or must fill requirement with information available from the National Governors Association, accessed on 




more Roman Catholics as a percentage of population in a given state, the less likely it is 
that state will have a RFRA, and the more likely it is that state will have a must fill 
requirement.126   The other independent variables have a positive or a negative 
relationship in the direction I would expect.  For example, I expected that if a greater 
proportion of the population thought religion was the primary guide to matters of right 
and wrong, then that state would be more likely to have a RFRA.  Negatively, I expected 
that if a greater proportion of the population was Unaffiliated in religious thought or 
practice, then that state would be less likely to have a RFRA and more likely to have a 
must fill requirement.   
     But are these relationships statistically significant?  Yes.  The number of must fill 
states is too small to measure meaningfully with this data.  Based on a two sample t-test, 
in the RFRA states every independent variable measured was statistically significant 
except for the Roman Catholic “belonging” variable and the Right to Life variable which 
barely missed the cut.  I was somewhat surprised by this because the Pew definition of 
“evangelical” was so broad and because I did not expect such predictability with Planned 
Parenthood or Right to Life expenditures.   Any measure less than 0.05 is statistically 
significant to the 95th percentile.  The p values for the independent variables are as 
follows: 
“Belonging” 
Evangelical                                 0.01224 
Roman Catholic                          0.1709 
Unaffiliated                                 0.009935 
                                                          
126
 Corwin E. Smidt, American Evangelicals Today (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013).  I should have 
looked at Smidt earlier.  He assembles a good bit of data indicating that on some points at least – such as a 
belief in absolute standards of right and wrong, which may be very influential in policy matters – Roman 
Catholics increasingly look like mainline Protestants. That is, they are not very distinctive on some issues. 





Daily Prayer                                0.002214 
 
“Believing” 
Bible as Word of God                 0.000978 
Religion is Important                  0.000762 
Religion is Source of Guidance  0.000673 
 
Expenditures by Interest Groups 
Planned Parenthood                     0.007167 
Right to Life                                0.0548 
 
 
     I also tried various variables in combination using a logistical regression analysis but 
little seemed meaningful.  I had hypothesized that the most important factor might be the 
“Religion provides guidance in determining right and wrong” factor because it would 
tend to concentrate the adherents of this position into a more absolutistic group 
(eliminating some mainline Protestants and other faith groups who might say that religion 
is important but does not really provide moral standards).  This was not always the case, 
however.  
     For example, when the “Importance”, “Guidance”, “Planned Parenthood” and “Right 
to Life” variables were combined, “Importance” was the only significant variable with a 
value of 0.0333.  When “Roman Catholic”, “Guidance”, Planned Parenthood”, and 
“Right to Life” were combined, “Guidance” was the only significant variable with a 
value of 0.0268.   
     In sum, I found that five of my seven hypotheses were supported.  I did not find that 
the percentage of Roman Catholics was positively related to the presence of a RFRA.  
Nor did I find that “Religion is the primary source of guidance for determining right from 
 86 
 
wrong” was the most significant religious independent variable, although it was 
significant.  My conclusions are discussed more fully below.  
 
Comparison with Bridge  
     As noted above, Dave Bridge is the only scholar to examine state RFRAs and try to 
determine why states pass them.127  His specific research issue in 2012 was whether state 
RFRAs protecting religious liberty are passed because the state values liberty interests, or 
because the state values religious interests, and he concluded that they are passed because 
states value religious interests.  My research is complementary.  Like Bridge, I use the 
“belief, belong, behave” approach, but I operationalize these factors using different and 
more criteria.  I also use different data, using ANES data for national trends and Pew data 
from both 2014 and 2007, whereas Bridge only had 2007 data available.  Like Bridge, I 
find positive relationships between my independent variables and my dependent variable 
of a RFRA.  Bridge did not study must fill laws.  
     But there are also significant differences in research and result.  For his “belief” 
independent variable, Bridge used a formulation that asked the respondent if his religion 
was the one true religion that led to eternal life.  The more people who held that position, 
the more likely it was that state would have a RFRA. Similarly, the more Catholics in a 
state, the more likely that state would have a RFRA.  My research with respect to Roman 
Catholic populations reaches a different conclusion.  While he found the percentage of 
evangelicals to be insignificant, I find it to have a significant relationship.  In Bridge’s 
                                                          
127 Bridge, "Religious Freedom or Libertarianism: What Explains State Enactments of Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act Laws?." 
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study, Missouri was the outlier because it did not have many Roman Catholics and yet 
had a RFRA.  I have no problem explaining why Missouri has a RFRA when, according 
to the Pew combined “religiosity” index, it ranks 15th in the country.   I have my own 
outlier with West Virginia.   With my independent variables, I cannot explain why it does 
not have a RFRA.   (It is the highest ranking “religious” state without a RFRA, at number 
seven.)  Finally, some of our differences may be explained because I have 22 RFRA 


















CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Conclusions 
     I conclude that more religious states, as measured by traditional and commonly 
accepted measures of religiosity, tend to protect free exercise more using RFRAs as the 
policy outcome to do so.  I conclude that less religious and more secular states, as 
measured by traditional and commonly accepted measures of religiosity, tend to protect 
free exercise less with RFRAs, and also tend to have a greater likelihood of having a 
must fill requirement.  That is, I find that general policy outcomes are reflective of 
general public opinion. 
     Medical conscientious objection is a subset of the conscientious objection which may 
be protected by RFRAs, and conscientious objection is itself only a subset of the universe 
of free exercise claims that might be made under RFRA.  That is, a pharmacist refusing to 
dispense an abortion pill, a parent objecting to a vaccination of a child using a weakened 
virus, a student objecting to the Pledge of Allegiance, an employee keeping inspirational 
sayings on her desk calendar at work, and a government employment applicant wearing 
certain attire for identification photographs may all invoke the balancing act required by a 
RFRA with respect to otherwise facially neutral, generally applicable requirements to the 
contrary.  All of these are free exercise claims.  But only the first three are conscientious 
objection claims, and only the first is a conscientious objection claim made by a medical 
professional.  Accordingly, I cannot measure or evaluate any specific and direct link 
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between general opinion as measured by, e.g., general questions in the Pew Study, and 
intermediate outcomes such as the passage of a RFRA, or even more specific outcomes 
such as effects on medical professionals.  Instead, I have evaluated the less precise link 
between general opinion and a more specific policy outcome.  Nonetheless, the 
relationship between this general opinion and specific outcome is apparent and 
meaningful.   The effect – requiring a balancing test – is caused by the adoption of a 
RFRA which had that intended and predictable effect.  And the adoption of a RFRA is 
clearly related to the size of the religious constituency in that jurisdiction. 
     The case is different with must fill states.  Here the link is much more specific.  A 
specific act is required of a particular segment of the population.  That is, it is a very 
specific policy outcome – much more specific than the outcome of a RFRA.  A major 
difficulty in evaluating it, however, is that the class size is so small.128  Yet here, too, the 
data indicate a relationship between the religious complexion of a state and its adoption 
of a must fill requirement.  These states are much different than the RFRA states, and 
those differences are meaningful.  The less religious a state, the more likely it is to have a 
must fill requirement.  
     But it is also clear that other factors are at work.  Some states that, according to my 
model, should be RFRA states, are not.  Some states that should be must fill states are 
not.  On the other hand, states that have RFRAs do not always have the same religious 
                                                          
128 That disadvantage has a corresponding advantage as well.  With only eight states, a comparative study 
of the states using specific opinion to study the relationship with the specific policy outcome in those states 
might be possible, leading to a generalized conclusion about the relationship of specific opinion to a 
specific policy outcome.  Most of these states are of sufficient size so that statewide opinion might be 
available.    
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characteristics.  Nor do states that have must fill requirements.   But there is still a family 
resemblance.  
     I make the following conclusions.  The more religious a state is, as measured by my 
selected “belonging, belief, and behavior” characteristics of its constituency (frequency 
of prayer, belief in the Bible as the Word of God, belief that religion is important, and 
belief that religion is the primary source of guidance in determining right and wrong), the 
greater the likelihood of there being a RFRA in that state.   Conversely, the less these 
characteristics are present, the more likely the state will have a “must fill” requirement.   
Contrary to my expectations, the greatest single indicator of a state having a RFRA is not 
the belief that religion is the primary source of determining right from wrong, but a more 
generalized notion that religion is important.   The greater the percentage of evangelicals 
in a constituency, the greater the likelihood of there being a RFRA, but the percentage of 
Roman Catholics does not seem to enhance the likelihood of there being a RFRA.  The 
greater the number of Unaffiliated in a constituency, the less likely it is the state will have 
a RFRA, but the more likely there will be a must fill requirement.   I also found that there 
is a relationship between the expenditure of funds by Planned Parenthood in a given state 
and whether that state has a “must fill” requirement or a RFRA.     
Qualifications 
     There are a number of significant qualifications to the findings of this study. 
     First, for state analysis I relied on Pew data from its 2014 Religious Landscape Study.  
Yet I was studying RFRAs from 1993.  The religious characteristics of a given state, or 
other variables or demographic factors that I did not consider, may have changed 
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considerably from the time the RFRA was considered or enacted.  It may be somewhat or 
even grossly inaccurate to use 2014 data when analyzing a 1993 or even a 2000 law.   
     Second, but less significant, the Pew Study is primarily a national study.  Fortunately, 
it was also designed to provide good state data.  Although the numbers of respondents is 
much higher than some other studies, both nationally and for each state, its number of 
respondents is rather low in some states.  Pew acknowledges this and has its own 
qualifications built into its findings.  
     Third, at its largest I was evaluating N=50 for the 50 states.  My subsets were 22 for 
RFRA states and only eight for must fill states.  As the numbers become lower, my 
confidence in the findings becomes less.129 I may be able to point toward suggestive 
relationships, but not more.   Similarly, with respect to the relationship between the 
passage of a RFRA or must fill requirement, I counted the governors, but made no 
allowance, e.g., for how strong an executive a particular state has.  Also, these very small 
classes of states exaggerate results when a RFRA is passed over a Democratic governor’s 
veto, or when a must fill law is implemented with no input from any of the political 
branches.  
     Fourth, as noted in my Conclusions subsection, I have a built in research design issue 
if not problem in relating general opinion (Pew responses to general questions) to a 
specific policy outcome (RFRAs or must fill requirements), and compound the issue by 
then focusing on a subset of that specific policy outcome (medical conscientious 
objection.)  The relationships are not tightly linked.  They are closer with respect to the 
must fill requirement, but then the N is quite small for much statistical analysis.  Thus, 
                                                          
129 I note that both Bridge and Brace studied data with low N numbers and their research passed muster.  
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although I can conclude relationships exist, I must be cautious in making very precise 
findings.  
     Fifth, I limited my thesis to individual medical conscientious objectors.  Analyzing 
institutional objectors would be a different undertaking.  Yet in not addressing the matter 
I missed the links between the two.  The demands placed on institutional objectors are 
unprecedented in some ways, and the ways in which enforced conformity are similar to 
and different from individuals could have been helpful in my study.  
     Sixth, I used a dichotomous outcome for both RFRAs and must fills.  This is helpful 
for analysis, but tends to artificially group dissimilar outcomes together.  There are 
differences in state RFRAs and differences in must fill requirements.  These differences, 
if studied and coded for, could result in more nuanced and accurate findings and a better 
understanding of how opinion translates into policy.  A qualitative study might be 
productive.  Another productive avenue would be to code the states with ordinal variables 
for political analysis.  A state passing a RFRA or must fill law in the normal way, with 
two legislative chambers and a governor’s approval would receive more points than a 
requirement or exemption passing over a gubernatorial veto, which itself would be coded 
differently  than a requirement that had been imposed pursuant to an executive order or 
regulation.  Such an approach would help in understanding the interaction between a 
broader array of political actors in obtaining specific policy outcomes.   
     Seventh, I used too many variables that I think actually influence the outcome.  I 
should have picked some commonly used demographic variables of populations – 
income, geography, race, education, urbanization - if only to be able to exclude them as 
causal factors.   In addition, I might try to find other variables that would explain, e.g., 
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why West Virginia does not have a RFRA, whether demographic, institutional, 
governmental, or other.130  
     Eighth, I used the Pew definitions of evangelical, Roman Catholic, and Unaffiliated in 
the “belonging” independent variable.  Generally, Pew asked respondents to identify with 
a particular religious group, and then coded that group into evangelical, Roman Catholic, 
mainline Protestant, and other religious groups.  Thus, an evangelical in a mainline 
Protestant denomination counts as a mainline Protestant.  And respondents who identify 
as “Baptist” or “Roman Catholic” are classed into the evangelical or Roman Catholic 
categories even if they have not attended church in years.  I think these categories are 
useful but are imprecise and may overstate the group allegiance or identity of many 
respondents.  This weakness is largely but not completely remedied by including other 
independent variables for behavior and believing.   
     Ninth and discussed more fully below, I did not analyze how support for and 
opposition to RFRAs has evolved over time.  I think this is a significant and fascinating 
evolution which is not captured in my research.   
 
Evolution of Support for and Opposition to RFRAs 
     Although the federal RFRA passed overwhelmingly in 1993 and included support 
both from the National Conference of Bishops and the ACLU, it would no longer enjoy 
such support, and in fact support has flagged at the state level, or even turned to 
                                                          
130 Bridge did this in his study of RFRAs, however.  He examined socioeconomic controls such as race, 
household income, and population.  None had an effect on the substantive results. Still, I would like to able 
to confirm or deny a relationship based on my own research.  
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opposition.   One major qualification of my state RFRA findings is that the interests and 
arguments have shifted.  In 1993 RFRA was perceived as a shield, an attempt to restore a 
balancing test to protect religious minorities.  RFRAs were intended to protect the 
religious from the consequences of the Smith Court.  Now RFRAs at the federal or state 
level are frequently perceived as a sword, an attempt to preserve the power of religious 
majorities vis a vis any others.  The perception is that RFRAs are intended to protect the 
religious from the Obergefell Court.  The debates about the more recently enacted state 
RFRAs have been about gay rights perhaps even more than the right of free exercise.  
The consensus that existed in 1993 no longer exists.131  The dynamics, interests, and 
allies in the policy debates have shifted, and the window is likely closing for any more 
RFRAs.  
      The future research possibility is, however, intriguing.  In 1993 the ACLU was a 
strong supporter of the federal RFRA and the Roman Catholic Church was a reluctant 
supporter.  The ACLU’s website now calls that support a mistake.  In my research on 
Planned Parenthood I noted the many coalition allies it has in the “must fill” struggle, 
including the Human Rights Campaign and the ACLU.  It would be interesting to trace 
the shifting policy coalitions for must fill legislation and in opposing any additional 
                                                          
131  This was made explicit by the ACLU, a supporter of RFRAs in 1993 and an ardent opponent now.  The 
“shield” and “sword” language is common in the law, but was also used by the ACLU in its announcement 
of opposition to RFRAs in the June 25, 2015 Washington Post.  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/congress-should-amend-the-abused-religious-freedom-
restoration-act/2015/06/25/ee6aaa46-19d8-11e5-ab92-c75ae6ab94b5_story.html  Accessed March 9, 2016.   
The purpose of RFRAs, to much of the public, is not to require a balancing test when religious exercise is 
burdened, but to permit discrimination against gays.  “The goal is to give business owners a stronger legal 
defense if they refuse to serve lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender customers and want to cite their faith 
as justification for their actions.”   Jonathan Cohn, Huffington Post, April 1, 2015, accessed on March 9, 
2015 at  http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/01/indiana-religious-freedom_n_6984156.html A very 
similar statement and analysis were used by CNN”s online news on March 24, 2016 in discussing the 
Georgia RFRA and the huge amount of opposition to it articulated by large companies. There was almost 
no mention of free exercise.  
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RFRAs over time as the perceived need for and purpose of state RFRAs has shifted.  
Such coalition shifting has been studied in other contexts but not for state RFRAs.  
     Similarly, for supporters of  RFRAs, the evolution of free exercise coalitions from 
peyote to sacrificial chickens to archbishops would provide some fascinating analysis as 
well as the best article title of the year.   
     The differences in coalitions, support, and opposition can be illustrated by the 
experiences of Connecticut and Indiana.  Connecticut passed a RFRA in 1993, soon after 
Smith, and it provides much stronger protection for free exercise than does Indiana’s 
2015 RFRA because Connecticut requires a balancing test with respect to any burden on 
free exercise.  Indiana, on the other hand, passed its RFRA in the age not of Smith but of 
Obergefell, and its law requires a “significant burden” on free exercise before any 
balancing test is conducted.   Even though his state provides greater statutory protection 
for free exercise, Connecticut Governor Malloy immediately banned state employee 
travel to the more restrictive Indiana.132  One difference, of course, and perhaps the main 
reason, is that Connecticut has another statute protective of gay interests, whereas Indiana 
did not at the time its RFRA was originally passed.  Another is simply how values 
evolve, and how those changing values are translated into policy outcomes over time.   In 
many jurisdictions, what is more fundamental and perhaps more popular is protecting 
LGBT interests rather than free exercise.  Yet a third is the reverse of one of my research 
problems.   I examined general opinion data (religiosity) to make some findings about a 
specific policy outcome – medical conscientious objection via a more general policy 
                                                          
132 And almost immediately reinstated it. I am not aware of any discussion by Governor Malloy about his 




outcome, enactment of RFRAs.  RFRA, of course, is much broader than conscientious 
objection, and has proponents and detractors independently of medical conscientious 
objector.  The loudest argument (if not the strongest argument) about RFRAs today, 
however, is as a possible Obergefell limitation, not accommodation of medical objections 
to certain practices and procedures.   
     Constitutional law professor Gerard Bradley is blunt:  “The most urgent challenges to 
religious freedom in the United States today involve conscience protection.  There are 
two contexts in which the challenge is especially grave.  One is healthcare…  The second 
conscience-protection context pivots upon the remarkable, and remarkably swift, 
turnaround in legal attitudes towards homosexual and lesbian behavior.”133   
     Indiana’s RFRA law, already noted above, is standard in all respects and provides 
that: 
Sec. 8. (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), a governmental entity may not 
substantially burden a person's exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule 
of general applicability. (b) A governmental entity may substantially burden a person's 
exercise of religion only if the governmental entity demonstrates that application of the 
burden to the person: (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) 
is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.134 
     Indiana’s RFRA, as amended, specifically carves out an exception providing that “a 
provider may not refuse to offer or provide services, facilities, use of public 
accommodations, goods, employment, or housing … on the basis of race, color, religion, 
ancestry, age, national origin, disability, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, or 
                                                          
133 Gerard V. Bradley, Essays on Law, Morality, and Religion (South Bend, Indiana :: St. Augustine's Press, 
2014). P. 62 
134  Text is from Indiana’s RFRA as provided by the Indianapolis Star,  
http://www.indystar.com/story/news/politics/2015/03/27/text-indianas-religious-freedom-law/70539772/  
accessed on March 9, 2016. 
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United States military service.”135   That is, free exercise interests will be balanced 
against state interests, but not when these old or new categories are implicated.  There is 
no balancing test when one of these acts is coupled with one of these categories of 
protected persons.  Otherwise, the statute remains fairly standard and straightforward.136  
Indiana residents will have their free exercise interests balanced against a compelling and 
narrowly drawn state interest unless it implicates one of these groups, in which case there 
is no free exercise protected by the law.  
     Future studies could measure and analyze this recent trend using specific opinion.  For 
example, would respondents support state RFRAs if an exception was made for gay 
interests?  That would tend to require a balancing of interests in all the medical examples 
used in this paper.  Or is a lukewarm attitude or even hostility toward free exercise so 
dominant that even with this exception constituencies would oppose a RFRA?  If so, that 
would mark a sea change in American opinion since the 1990s.  
Future Research 
     As noted above, the evolution of support for and opposition to state RFRAs provides a 
research rich environment.  It could be used to study coalitions in the formation of public 
policy outcomes.  It could test how responsive and congruent specific opinion is in 
forming policy outcomes.  Other research areas are also apparent. 
     The limitations of my own study indicate that this would be a good area to conduct an 
experiment using specific opinion.  In the alternative, in some of the larger states, specific 
                                                          
135 The additional RFRA language was enacted just a few days after the basic RFRA was enacted, and 
affects Indiana Code 3-13-9, effective July 1, 2015.   
136 The Indiana RFRA is otherwise unremarkable, and mirrors the federal RFRA in enacting a “strict 
scrutiny” standard of review in section 8.   
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opinion in the form of newspaper or TV news polling might shed light on the “specific 
opinion translating into specific policy outcomes” issue.  “Should pharmacists be 
permitted to refuse to fill prescriptions they have moral objections to?”  “Should they lose 
their license?”  Does the answer depend on the burden placed on the patient?  Does it 
depend on the moral position of the respondent?   Or on the religion of the respondent? 
     Specific opinion and a long list of demographic, political, and social factors could be 
used in a case study of two or three states which have similar independent variable data 
characteristics but different dependent variable outcomes in an effort to isolate the causes 
for enactment or rejection of a RFRA or must fill requirement.  Why does state A have a 
RFRA, but state B with very similar characteristics, does not?  An in depth study of West 
Virginia might reveal the factors that cause it not to have a RFRA notwithstanding the 
presence of many criteria that suggest it “should” have one.  
     Another possible study pertains to religious groups and their adaptation to or 
resistance to change, especially changed imposed by the government under penalty of 
sanctions.  In modern times in the West and especially the U.S. few religious groups have 
been subjected to enforced conformity, or severe sanctions for nonconformity, let alone 
persecution.  These groups tended to be on the fringes, and some have built (in some 
quarters) a (grudging) respect from others who admire their integrity and courage if 
nothing else.  Christian Scientists and Jehovah’s Witnesses may have done more for the 
First Amendment than most groups.  This may be changing as the state demands 
conformity in matters long objected to by large numbers of Americans and institutions.   
In her typology of the relationship between conscience and the state, Cookson posits four 
types of responses which may challenge, transform, conform to, or reject the demands of 
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the state.137  Some religious groups and some individuals are conformists.  They may 
object and lobby and litigate, but ultimately they obey and conform.  Other groups are 
nonconformists and will pay a high price in refusing the demands of the state.   It would 
be interesting to use her typology to analyze the conscience objections of individuals and 
institutions in must fill states, or of those willing to assist in the death of others as a 
matter of compassion in states without “death with dignity” laws, or in rejecting the 
requirements of the PPACA, or in a great many other contexts where balancing is 
rejected in favor of an absolutist position by the state.  How do such demands and such 
resistance affect the perceived legitimacy of the state?   
     Further research could be made about the nature of the quantitative measures used to 
gauge religiosity.  How can the responses of respondents be made more useful and 
accurate?  How can we adjust the quantitative measures of “religiosity” to more 
accurately parallel what we want to study, rendering greater confidence in findings about 
religious belief and practice?    
     Finally, and from a macro perspective, what are the implications for democracies or 
for our understanding of how democracies work regarding the degree of protection a 
liberty interest has in law or society independent of its own narrow ideological interest 
group?  If RFRAs are at least in part related to the percentage of a constituency that is 
religiously oriented, do other liberty interests operate in the same way?  Is a limitation on 
freedom of speech or freedom to assemble peaceably dependent on the percentage or 
strength of a constituency that personally adheres to these interests as personal interests, 
or are there other important factors?  Does it matter that these interests are non-
                                                          
137 Cookson, Regulating Religion.  See her typology in Chapter 3, “Law and Dis-orderly Religion” pp 48ff.   
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threatening to the interests of the state or society?  That is, can we tolerate only those 
uninfluential people and institutions on the fringes?  Does it matter that these interests to 
be imposed are considered to be fundamental to the interests of the state or society? It 
may be that simple interest group identity or affinity tends to trump more generalized 
ideological ideas such as “liberty”.  If so, this has profound implications for our 
understanding of the formation, preservation, fragmentation, and dissolution of 
democracies.  
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